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Message From the Director

BG James O. Barclay, III, USA
Director, JCOA

In July 2006, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) entered Lebanon with massive air and ground attacks, primarily in retribution for the killing of several soldiers by Hizballah, but also in an effort to rescue two soldiers being held captive. This attack was just the latest in a series of conflicts between Israel, its neighbors, and several paramilitary organizations (Palestine Liberation Organization and Hizballah are two of these) dating back to the 1940s. The "Second Lebanon War" as it is called in Israel, or the "July War" as it is called in Lebanon, broke a pattern of capture and prisoner exchange that had occurred over several years.

Of interest is the Winograd Commission Interim Report that examines the failure of the Israeli leadership to apply the lessons of past conflicts before beginning this latest military effort. Equally important is a study of the preparations the Hizballah had taken to frustrate the ground forces in their advance into Lebanon. For that reason, this study is provided as an analysis of the conflict, with attention to some key battles, background information on Hizballah, and the efforts of the United Nations to curtail the conflict and establish peace in the area.

The first article "*Hizballah - The Party of God*," by LtCol Jeff Goodes and Maj Sharon Moore, gives a history of Hizballah in Lebanon. This article is followed by "*An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program*" that is reprinted from the *Jerusalem Quarterly* and gives insight into the thoughts and goals of the Hizballah leadership.

The next five articles are all from Maj Moore and are a series of analytical synopses of the "*Road To War,*" the "*2006 Lebanon War: An Operational Analysis,*" "*Harb Tammuz 2006: A Timeline,*" and two specific battles that were key to the war: "*The Battle of Bint Jubayl"* and "*The Battle of Wadi Saluki*." Following these are some documents for further understanding of the topic - the "*UN Security Council: Lebanon Resolution 1701,"* a "*Summary of the Winograd Commission Interim Report,"* and the "*Executive Summary of the Final Winograd Report"* released on 30 January 2008.

The eleventh article, "*Terrorist to Techno Guerilla: The Changing Face of Assymetric Warfare*," by Mr. Clyde Royston, discusses the expanding use of technology within terrorist organizations to further their goals. Mr. Royston, as part of a JCOA team that deployed to Israel to observe the noncombatant evacuation operations during the 2006 July War, recognized that technology has become an integral part of the growing arsenal used by these organizations - from simple use of airliners to attack targets to the highly technical use of the Internet and cyberspace capabilities to communicate.

The final article is an addition to the previous Journal focused on Counterinsurgency (Volume VIII, Issue 3 - Sept 2006). Mr. Rod Propst is the Principal Terrorism Analyst for Anser Corporation and his paper "Insurgency and the Role of the 21st Century Special Operator" is an introductory study guide for those who wish to learn more about the subject. Here he provides a synopsis of numerous books and studies on insurgency and counterinsurgency.

JAMES O. BARCLAY, III
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Director, Joint Center for Operational Analysis

JCOA UPDATE

As mentioned in the last Journal, in October 2007 General Petraeus, Commander Multinational Forces–Iraq (MNF-I), tasked the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) to study intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) employment in Iraq — this tasking resulted in the *Counterinsurgency, Targeting, and ISR Employment Study* (CTI). The focus of the classified CTI study is how forces in Iraq integrate and employ ISR capabilities in a counterinsurgency environment. On 19 January 2008, BG Barclay, Director JCOA, briefed General Petraeus and his staff. The briefing was well received and JCOA has been subsequently directed to provide briefings to various other senior leaders and staffs. To date, the Deputy commander Central Air Force (CENTAF), US Air Force A2/3, US Army G2, and Joint Staff J3 have been briefed. Admiral Fallon, Commander US Central Command (CENTCOM), and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are scheduled for late February. A briefing to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is likely on the horizon. The actual report is currently being vetted within the Multinational Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) and is expected to be completed and available for distribution mid-March.

In other news, General Mattis replaced General Smith as the new Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Commander. He started several new initiatives, one of which is a focused and more responsive effort to support MNF-I. JCOA is the designated lead, with oversight over both the forward and rear support elements. The mission is to provide MNF-I with a more capable and focused presence in the theater of operations to identify, capture, validate, integrate, coordinate, and distribute innovations and lessons learned at the joint strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The end game is to provide solutions back to MNF-I to any identified problems, whether through JFCOM or external processes. Another initiative that involves JCOA resources, but is not led by JCOA, is the standup of two separate organizations that report directly back to the Deputy JFCOM Commander: a Futures cell and Asymmetric cell.

Externally, we have stepped up our interaction with the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Israel. The sharing of lessons learned and best practices between the countries will help each nation to fight a more effective and mutually supportive fight. In many cases, the same challenges and the same enemy are faced by us all in the War on Terror.

The future of JCOA is bright. The CTI study has once again shown the Department of Defense the quality and accuracy of our work. We anticipate additional follow on study requests from the CENTCOM area of responsibility to support the four star commanders. The next step for JCOA and the command is to transform our findings into actionable solutions for the warfighter. The challenges are many in this process, but JCOA and JFCOM are moving forward on the road to improvement.

"Better to be wise by the misfortunes of others than by your own." - Aesop

Mr. Bruce Beville
Deputy Director JCOA

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Hizbollah: The Party of God

LtCol Jeffery O. Goodes, USMC
MAJ Sharon Tosi Moore, USAR

Editor's Note: There are several acceptable ways to spell "Hizballah" and, depending on the source/author, you will see a couple of variations within this JCOA Journal. In the Arab region it is generally spelled "Hizb" [party of] "Allah" [God]. However, in western nation texts you may see it spelled as "Hezballah," "Hezbollah," or "Hizbollah."

History of Hizbollah in Lebanon

> ***"To Create a country is one thing; to create a nationality is another"*** – Kamil Salibi

Hizbollah, or "the Party of God" is a militant organization that has operated out of southern Lebanon since 1982. For almost eighteen years its main focus was to drive Israeli forces out of Lebanon using terrorist and guerrilla tactics. Hizbollah's unexpected success coupled with the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces in May 2000 forced its leadership to expand their vision and transform into a political entity, albeit one with a strong military wing. Hizbollah has continued to flex their muscle in Lebanon, threatening not only their neighbors, but the existing government. However, it is impossible to understand the creation and growth of Hizbollah without a deeper understanding of modern Lebanese history.

Creating Lebanon

As with most entities in the Middle East, politics and religion are inextricably linked in Lebanon. Unlike other countries in the Middle East, Lebanon was a mosaic of religious factions dominated by Maronite Christians as opposed to Muslims. The 1926 National Constitution embraced this pan-religious framework and required the proportional allocation of government jobs and appointments on a religious basis. At the time, the largest political entity after the Maronites, was the Sunni Muslims, with the Shia Muslims[1] running a distant third. After winning independence from France in 1943, the new government entered into an unofficial power-sharing agreement, called the "National Covenant," that stipulated a Maronite President, a Sunni Prime Minister, and a Shia speaker of the parliament. Similarly, the Constitution split parliamentary seats among the 17 recognized sectarian communities (four Muslim, 12 Christian, and one Jewish), based on relative numerical strength. These numbers, determined by a single census conducted in the 1930's, shaped the government until the conclusion of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990.

Initially, the Shia were overwhelmingly clustered in the South and the northern Beqaa valley, where they eked out subsistence farming and had few job prospects. An influx of Palestinian refugees starting in 1948 provided a pool of cheap labor that dominated the few available jobs. The government did little to develop these regions and the Shia communities remained largely dominated by zu'ama (political bosses) of a handful of powerful families. As a result, Shia youth often emigrated to Africa, South America, or other Arab countries, and then returning with pocketfuls of cash. These returning émigrés had few ties to the traditional Lebanese Shia society and their time outside of Lebanon only served to increase their contempt for the corrupt ruling families.

During the 1950's and 1960's Lebanon developed a thriving free-market economy by serving as the banking, transport, and trade hub for the region. Because of the large Christian population, Lebanon was more closely tied to the western world and benefited from an abundance of western tourism. Often called "the Switzerland of the Middle East," Lebanon was also the most democratic country in the Arab league, and the political freedom enjoyed there drew in immigrants from surrounding areas, especially Palestine.

However, this economic growth disproportionately benefited those in and around the Beirut area. As in the past, those in the outlying regions did not benefit from this boom, although they did finally get electricity, paved roads, and other basic infrastructure. Alienated and angered by the prosperity denied them, these disaffected youths were drawn to the secular opposition parties such as the Syrian Social Network Party (SSNP), the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), the Organization for Communist Labor action, and various factions of the Arbat Socialist Ba'ath Parties. These groups, generally led by Christians, provided an

outlet for the rage building against a corrupt capitalistic society that only benefited the privileged class.

During this time, birth rates and immigration fueled a huge demographic shift moving the population from 55 percent Christian to 60 percent Muslim.[2] The Shia population in particular grew until it became roughly equal to the Sunnis, unusual since Shia only make up approximately 10 percent of the total Muslim population. This large youth bubble, coupled with a perceived power imbalance, simmered under the surface of the Lebanese society, especially since there was no shift in the governmental allocations. The constitutional framework no longer reflected the demographic realities in the nation. Despite the attempts by the Christian majority to promote a Lebanese national identity, the Muslim population still identified more closely with its Arab neighbors.

Lebanon established its identity as an Arab nation in 1945, when it became a founding member of the Arab League. This group, created in 1945 to secure Arab unity, rarely had many national interests in common, save their mutual hatred of Israel. When Gamel Nasser took control of Egypt, he aggressively promoted his vision a pan-Arab state, something that seemed possible during the brief 1958 merger of Syria and Egypt. This, coupled with Nasser's close relationship with the Soviet Union, split the Arab league into the two factions, with pro-communist Egypt and Syria on one side and pro-western Iraq and Jordan on the other. Caught in the middle, Lebanon attempted to mediate between the two. When this failed, President Camille Chamoun moved his country into the pro-western camp, especially since the United States promised military and economic aid to any Arab country threatened by communist aggression.

Already under fire for his inaction during the Suez crisis, President Chaumon then tried to have the constitution amended in order to allow him a second six-year term. The internal opposition came to a head with the assassination of a prominent opposition newspaper editor on 8 May 1958. Although there was some overlap, the sides broke mainly along religious lines, with the Christians on one side and the Muslims on the other. Fearing the dissolution of the Army into religious cliques and reacting to reports of Syrian infiltrators aiding the rebels, the government turned to the United States to help put down the rebellion. Initially unwilling to commit, a July coup in Iraq underscored how vulnerable the western strategic position was in the Middle East, and the United States dispatched three Marine battalions to help stabilize the government, allowing the Lebanese Army to remain a neutral force throughout the upheaval. After the election and installation of the new government, American forces withdrew in October 1958. Gradually the Shia moved away from the pan-Arabic movement because the numerical Sunni dominance would ensure the suppression of the Shia voice in a unified Arab state. As a result, the Shia identity became more closely linked to the dispossessed, such as the Palestinian, as well as the reformists and the more radical Islamists.

In time, as the demographics shifted in favor of the Muslims, Shia and Sunni alike began to resent the guaranteed Christian control of the Lebanese government. An unlikely alliance between leftist organizations and various Muslim groups formed a powerful opposition coalition to the status quo. When demands for a new census (and subsequent governmental allocation shift) went unheeded and tensions escalated, the various religious groups began forming militias for self-protection. These militias soon surpassed the size and capabilities of the small, Christian-dominated Lebanese Army.

Musa al Sadr

During this time a young Shia cleric, Musa al Sadr, arrived from Iran. Tall, intelligent and charismatic, Sadr positioned himself as the champion of the underprivileged and an alternative to the corrupt and powerful Kamil al-Asad, the dominant Shia political boss. Al Sadr preached to the Shia that they could overcome their economic and political disadvantages by fully embracing Islam. In 1969 he was named to the Lebanese Supreme Islamic Shia Council, the

independent Shia representative body created to give Shia more say in the government.

Unlike those who came before him, al Sadr forged a communal identity among the Shia slum dwellers of Beirut, the Shia peasants of the south, and the Shia clansman of the Beqaa valley. He was vehemently anti-Communist, not on ideological grounds, but because these groups competed for the same pool of Shia followers. He launched the Shia political movement Harakat Mahroomin (Movement of the Deprived) and its attendant Amal militia. By the 1970's, although he led just a fraction of the Shia in Lebanon, al Sadr was the most influential Shia cleric in the country, often heard calling for peaceful relations between the various religious factors while still pushing for more power for the Shia.

However, the most important dynamic shift in Lebanon was the entrance of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) following its expulsion from Jordan in 1970. The Arab League created the PLO in 1964 at the urging of Egyptian President Nasser, who saw it as a means to advance his goal of a united Arab world under the banner of destroying Israel. By 1969 Yasser Arafat controlled the organization. He was a charismatic and bloodthirsty younger leader who advocated guerrilla and terrorist tactics to achieve his goals. Not satisfied with fighting the Israelis, he soon turned on the Jordanian government that had granted refuge to the Palestinians after the 1967 Six Day War. The Cairo Agreement, brokered by Nasser, forced Lebanon to allow the PLO to create an unofficial PLO state within their borders that was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Lebanese government. Not content with this, the PLO seized territory and brutalized and terrorized the population, although many of the Lebanese Muslims sympathized with the PLO cause and provided them with support.

Civil War 1977-1989

Tensions finally came to a head in April 1975, when members of the main Christian militia were assassinated in Beirut, setting off a series of reprisals and random killings. While the government exposed its ineffectiveness, the fighting spread throughout the country. Much more complex then simply Muslims versus Christians, the war highlighted the brutality of militias that did not discriminate between combatants and civilians. A 1976 Syrian-brokered peace agreement



quickly collapsed with the disintegration of the Lebanese Army, and the first phase of the war ended with Syrian occupation later in that same year.

It was an uneasy peace, with the PLO in control of southern Lebanon; Syrian forces in charge of the eastern Lebanon and West Beirut; and Christians in control of East Beirut and Mt Lebanon. Another serious blow to peace occurred with the mysterious disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, long seen as a voice of reason, following a visit to Libya in 1978.

Although Arafat initially refrained from entering the civil war, the PLO finally entered on the side of the leftist militias, whom they viewed as more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. After Syria intervened against them, the PLO withdrew to the south, concentrating on guerilla operations into Israel. These operations eventually triggered the second phase of the civil war, beginning when Israeli troops attacked southern Lebanon in 1978, pushing the PLO back to the Litani River. While the Israeli forces eventually withdrew, they did retain a 12 mile security zone along the border, reinforced by the Southern Lebanon Army (SLA), a Shia-Christian militia. Violent clashes between the PLO, the SLA, and Israel continued until an August 1981 cease-fire.

In the Syrian sector, clashes between the Phalange, a Maronite militia, and the Syrian forces grew increasingly aggressive over the next several years. Israel provided tacit support to the Phalanges, in hopes that a Maronite victory would install a friendly government. The United States derailed a proposed Israeli attack into Beirut stressing that there could be no assault without a major provocation from Lebanon. At this point, PLO had launched only one rocket attack

from Lebanon in the nine months since the cease fire, although PLO attacks continued unabated from other locations, such as Jordan and the West Bank.

In June 1982, the Abu Nidal Organization, a rival Palestinian terrorist organization, attempted to assassinate the Israeli ambassador in London. Despite the fact that the Abu Nidal was not associated with the PLO, and had in fact attempted to kill Arafat, Israel decided it was time to launch an attack on the PLO strongholds in southern Lebanon and clear them out once and for all. The Israelis pushed the PLO all the way to Beirut, albeit with heavy civilian casualties. Israel finally got its wish in August 1982 when the United Nations ordered the PLO out of Lebanon and oversaw the election of a Maronite President, who then turned a blind eye when the Phalangists massacred thousands of Palestinians in refugee camps.

It was in this time period that Amal experienced a resurgence of popularity among the Shia. Caught in the crossfire of Israel and the PLO, and increasingly resentful of the brutality with which the PLO treated the Lebanese Shia, Amal and PLO forces began clashing. Relations deteriorated to the point that Amal supported the Israeli invasion as a way to break the PLO hold on the region, to the disgust of many young Islamic radicals who viewed this as a betrayal of principles.

The Birth of Hizbollah

With the PLO out of the picture, there was a power vacuum in southern Lebanon among the Shia communities faced with the Israeli occupation. There was no Shia group strong enough to take control, especially among the more extreme Islamic groups. The successful Islamic Revolution in Iran provided an additional source of support to offset the growing dissatisfaction with Amal's willingness to negotiate with Israel. Eager to expand their vision of the perfect Islamic state, Iran sent over 1,000 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and money to mold these disparate groups into a unified Islamic Shia organization. This militia, known as "Hizb Allah" or "party of God" began conducting guerilla operations as a loose conglomeration of militias.

Map of Lebanon

Syria, with no overwhelming interest in which became the dominant Shia force, shrewdly fostered a strategic alliance with the emerging Hizbollah, while continuing to support Amal. Although Hizbollah embraced the Iranian line, they were not above taking support from Syria when it was offered. In fact, many of Hizbollah's early leaders had once belonged to Amal, but splintered away as Amal became increasingly involved in the corrupt political life of Lebanon. They used both Syrian and Iranian money not only to train, but to establish a social service network in Shia communities that soon surpassed those of Amal, and built a community base of support in southern Lebanon.

Although Hizbollah did not officially proclaim itself as an official organization until 1985, it did begin conducting operations around 1983 as a loosely

affiliated group of local militias. Hizbollah was among the first Islamic groups to embrace suicide bombing as a tactic, a method soon adopted by other extremist groups. Although it never accepted responsibility, experts credit Hizbollah with the 1983 truck bombings of the United States embassy, as well as the American and French barracks which forced the withdrawal of the international peacekeeping force. Evidence also points to Hizbollah involvement in numerous kidnappings and hijackings throughout the 1980's and 1990's, although its leaders have consistently denied involvement in all of these incidents.

Basically Hizbollah positioned itself as the opposition leader against the United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel, calling the superpowers corrupt regimes who acted only in self-interest. To this end, in 1985 Hizbollah leaders released their official proclamation in an *Open Letter to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World.* In this they announced Hizbollah as an Islamic organization that embraced the leadership of Iranian Ayatollah Khomeni and their jihad to create an Islamic world. The decree listed their goals as:

1. To expel the Americans, the French, and their allies from Lebanon;
2. To bring the Phalanges to justice for their crimes against Muslims and Christians;
3. To permit the people of Lebanon to choose their own government, although only an Islamic regime can stop imperialistic infiltration of the country.

Claiming to be the champion of all oppressed, the document goes on to call for the Christians in Lebanon to convert to Islam, rejects both capitalism and communism, and emphasizes the necessity of the destruction of Israel. Interestingly, the document never outlines Hizbollah's political goals for Lebanon, only stating that the present system is bad and that if they can choose, the Lebanese people will choose Islam, although there are no details as to what form this Islamic rule should take.

Operations

With time, Hizbollah evolved from a loose conglomeration of local militias to an organized political entity and a structured military force that rivals the national force. Similarly, Hizbollah operations developed along three intertwining branches: terrorism, organized military operations, and political activism. These three are inseparable and reflect the growing understanding and adaptability of the organization.

Hizbollah's operations began simply enough with the suicide truck bombing of an Israeli military convoy in March 1983, which killed and injured 120 Israeli soldiers. This act ushered in a new age of world wide guerilla operations as Hizbollah successfully integrated these suicide bombings into their wider campaign. It did not limit the bombings to Lebanon, as Hizbollah forces successfully detonated bombs as far away as Spain, Turkey, and Argentina.

In addition to the suicide bombing, Hizbollah integrated kidnappings–particularly of western journalists, embassy officials, and college professors–all of whom they suspected of operating as spies. Hizbollah murdered some and held others in exchange for ransom or prisoner exchanges. One American hostage, Terry Anderson, was held for almost seven years before being released. Hizbollah even had a few successful plane hijackings. These complex operations reflected the growing skill and military capabilities of the Hizbollah forces, probably from training with IRGC units both in Lebanon and Iraq, as well as experience gained by fighting the Israeli and Amal forces.

During this time Amal, backed by Syria, began attacking various Sunni and Palestinian militias in a three year struggle that became known as "The War of the Camps." The purpose of these raids was to abolish the power of Palestinian militants in the refugee camps around Beirut. Despite a sustained effort, Amal was never able to control the camps (mainly due to Hizbollah support of the militants) and the fighting spilled into southern Lebanon. This drew in Hizbollah forces that supported the Palestinian cause. In addition, Amal's attempted mediation during a 1985 hijacking infuriated Hizbollah leadership, who objected that Amal had no authority to negotiate on their behalf.

After indecisive battles in 1985, 1986, and 1988, the two sides settled into in a low level conflict until the September 1988 kidnapping of a US Marine observer by Hizbollah. Fearing that this would hurt its relations with the United Nations (UN) forces serving in the buffer zone, Amal consolidated its forces and launched an attack against Hizbollah forces in the south. During the battles many Amal soldiers, resentful of Amal's dependence on Syria, defected to Hizbollah, further strengthening its ties to the local population.

In 1989 Iran and Syria arranged the Taif Agreement that officially ended the civil war in a truce. The truce granted Amal authority over southern Lebanon and ordered Hizbollah to maintain only a nonmilitary presence. While appearing a victory for Amal, in fact it destroyed its credibility and power in the region. The local populace now saw Amal as part of a corrupt government with no interest in the issues of the Shia. Furthermore, while the treaty required all militias to disband, Hizbollah skirted this requirement by declaring itself an "Islamic resistance group" dedicated to driving Israel out of Lebanon. Hizbollah was now the strongest entity in southern Lebanon and able to position itself as the "true champion" of the Shia.

No longer faced with an ideological rival, Hizbollah shifted focus away from international forces and focused on attacking the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and Israeli forces occupying the security zone. The Israeli occupation gave Hizbollah a unifying cause around which to rally the Shia. Israel's apparent disregard for civilian casualties and property damage enabled Hizbollah to further cement their status with the local populace by being quick to repair any damage caused by Israeli operations.

Until the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, the interactions between the two forces fell into an accepted pattern of attack and reprisal. By tacit agreement, Hizbollah focused its attacks on Israeli forces, and Israeli forces did not deliberately target Lebanese civilians. Both sides were adept at pushing the boundaries of this unspoken agreement and, at times, one side or the other went overboard. The most egregious example of this was an Israeli air and artillery attack on a UN refugee camp in Qana which killed 106 civilians. This act brought widespread condemnation and became a rallying cry for the Lebanese people. For its part, Hizbollah occasionally lobbed katuysha rockets into Israel or kidnapped Israeli soldiers.

Leadership and organization

> **"With respect to us, briefly, Islam is not a simple religion including only praises and prayers, rather it is a divine message that was designed for humanity, and it can answer any question man might ask concerning his general and private life. Islam is a religion designed for a society that can revolt and build a state."** Hassan Nasrallah

In 1991, recognizing the need to legitimize their power base, Hizbollah leaders decided to participate in the upcoming Lebanese national elections, moving the organization into the next phase of its evolution. The Secretary-General, Subhi al-Tufayli, a founding member of Hizbollah and a dedicated follower of the teachings of Ayatollah Khomeni vehemently opposed this decision. Al-Tufayi understood that entering the political arena meant cooperating with non-Muslims, and he was not willing to compromise his vision of a pure Islamic state.

Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi soon replaced al-Tufayi. The new Secretary-General understood the importance of political legitimacy and the need for Hizbollah to evolve beyond a purely military force. His tenure was cut short by an Israeli helicopter attack on his motorcade in 1992 and Hassan Nasrallah ascended to the post. At just 31 years old, Nasrallah was already a respected cleric and former member of the Amal central political office.

Like most other Lebanese Shia clerics, Nasrallah had studied theology in Najaf, Iraq under Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, a passionate follower of the Ayatollah Khomeni. Nasrallah not only supported the Hizbollah political aspirations, but recognized the need to build up its organized military capabilities in order to best combat the Israeli forces. His success in both these areas has become the model for other resistance groups in the Middle East, particularly Hamas.

Hassan Nasrallah

The need to move from radical fringe to legitimate political participant required Hizbollah leaders to minimize their aspirations for an Islamic Republic. This forced Nasrallah and the other leaders to acknowledge the legitimacy of, and cooperate with, the

secular government in Beirut, although it did not lessen their loyalty to Iran and Syria. In turn, the government accepted Hizbollah control of southern Lebanon if its military activities focused on Israeli occupying forces and not the government.

Nasrallah would not have managed this transition to politics without the assistance of Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, the most influential cleric in southern Lebanon. Born and raised in Najaf, Iraq, Fadlallah had long followed the Iranian Ayatollah Khomeni. However, Fadlallah had a strong pragmatic streak and realized that the diverse Lebanese society could not be easily converted to Islamic rule. Instead, he emphasized the need to operate within the political system and make compromises as necessary, while continuing to advance the Islamic agenda. His focus on building a complex system of schools, businesses, and other social institutions, coupled with his emphasis on charity and service, helped establish Hizbollah as the leading provider of social services in southern Lebanon, albeit one heavily financed by Iran. While Amal continued to provide some services, it did not have the same level of financing and was not able to compete.

Hizbollah's political strategy downplayed religious themes, focusing instead on battling economic inequalities and underdevelopment. As a result, when the elections were finally held in 1992, Hizbollah won 12 out of 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament, including eight of the Shia-specific seats. This made Hizbollah the largest single party bloc elected, although a widespread Christian boycott of the elections also helped. The Shia people had long felt disenfranchised by the political process and saw Hizbollah as a chance for political empowerment. In all subsequent elections, Hizbollah has maintained a steady 10 percent of available seats, while building alliances in order to increase their power beyond the artificial caps placed on the number of candidates each party is allowed to field. In fact, in the 2000 election, the once-improbable Amal-Hizbollah alliance captured all 23 of the southern Lebanon seats, and more then 25 percent of all the seats in Parliament.

Unlike the Parliamentary elections, which were manipulated by Syria, local municipal elections have been largely left to the people. In these elections, Hizbollah formed the most improbable alliances with various secular and communist parties in order to increase their power base. When the first municipal elections were held in 1998, Hizbollah controlled 15 percent of the municipalities; by 2004 this margin increased that control to 21 percent.

Israeli Withdrawal and the Cedar Revolution

On 24 May 2000, Israel completed its unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Intended to encourage peace, instead it signaled to Hizbollah and other resistance groups that Israel was weak in the face of guerilla activity. Left without its *raison d'etre*, Hizbollah turned its focus to the Israeli forces still occupying the Sha'aba Farms district, which it claims as part of Lebanon but the UN recognizes as part of the Syrian Golan Heights. In addition, Hizbollah claimed that it must continue to fight until all Lebanese and Palestinian detainees are released.

Initially, the Lebanese people were euphoric at this victory and grateful to Hizbollah as the perceived agent of this change. However, as time went on and Hizbollah continued its attack on Israeli forces, the Lebanese people began to tire of the continued battle. Critics, especially those in the media, saw these operations as reckless and unjustified. Additionally, international adulation positioned Nasrallah as the unelected head of Lebanon, a move that fostered resentment from the newly reelected Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Although a successful prisoner exchange with Israel in 2004 helped propel Hizbollah in the national elections, most Lebanese were ready to move forward. Having thrown off the mantle of one occupation, the Lebanese people were increasingly eager to end the Syrian occupation and domination of their country.

Hariri's 2004 resignation in the face of a Syrian plan to extend the tenure of the Syrian-approved President, in direct violation of the Lebanese constitution, coupled with his assassination in 2005, proved a tipping point for the Lebanese people. Brought together in an unprecedented show of unity, the Lebanese people forced the withdrawal of the Syrian military and new elections. Hizbollah immediately formed counter-protests, boosting their numbers with Syrian guest workers. This risky maneuver put Hizbollah firmly in the Syrian camp and placed its leaders in opposition to the Lebanese people for the first time since the end of the civil war. Hizbollah also joined with a

pro-Syrian Christian group to prevent the anti-Syrian faction from gaining the two-thirds majority needed to oust the government. Utilizing this large bloc and two cabinet positions, Hizbollah has effectively frozen the Lebanese government at will and forced concessions to their group.

Many politicians urged Hizbollah to disarm, a move which they have steadfastly refused. Hizbollah claimed that the weakness of the Lebanese Army made its militia the only credible defense force. Additionally, Hizbollah continued its operations against Israel by attempting to capture Israeli soldiers and, basically, taunting Israel to retaliate. On 12 July 2006 Israel did just that, launching a 33-day war intended to break the back of Hizbollah once and for all. Both sides paid a heavy price, both materially and morally, and the war ended with no clear victor.

While Hizbollah's perceived victory against Israel boosted their credibility among other resistance groups across the Middle East, the attitudes within Lebanon are decidedly mixed, especially when faced with a $4 billion reconstruction bill. Although Hizbollah rushed to repair damage from Israeli attacks, the prevailing sentiment was that the Lebanese people were paying for a Hizbollah folly. Lebanon now stands divided, with the Cedar Revolutionaries on one side and a pro-Syrian Hizbollah-led coalition on the other. Whatever the outcome, it appears that Hizbollah will continue to play a significant role in determining the future of Lebanon and, by extension, the Middle East.

Endnotes:

[1] Although there are deeper theological and political differences, the initial split came after the death of Muhammed. Shia believe that Muhammed's cousin/son-in-law Ali was the designated successor and that all Caliphs must come from Muhammed's family; Sunnis believe that Muhammed's father-in-law Abu Bakr was the first Caplih.

[2] Sunnis and Shia have approximately 29 percent each; Maronites approximately 20 percent. No other sect has more then five percent of the population.

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An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program

Editor's Note: *This article is reprinted from the Jerusalem Quarterly, Fall 1988, in order to give the reader some background and insight into the thoughts of the Hizballah.*

Our Identity

We are often asked: Who are we, the Hizballah, and what is our identity? We are the sons of the umma (Muslim community) - the party of God (Hizb Allah) the vanguard of which was made victorious by God in Iran. There the vanguard succeeded to lay down the bases of a Muslim state which plays a central role in the world. We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and faqih (jurist) who fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini. God save him!

By virtue of the above, we do not constitute an organized and closed party in Lebanon, nor are we a tight political cadre. We are an umma linked to the Muslims of the whole world by the solid doctrinal and religious connection of Islam, whose message God wanted to be fulfilled by the Seal of the Prophets, i.e., Muhammad. This is why whatever touches or strikes the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, and elsewhere reverberates throughout the whole Muslim umma of which we are an integral part. Our behavior is dictated to us by legal principles laid down by the light of an overall political conception defined by the leading jurist (wilayat al-faqih).

As for our culture, it is based on the Holy Koran, the Sunna and the legal rulings of the faqih who is our source of imitation (marja' al-taqlid). Our culture is crystal clear. It is not complicated and is accessible to all.

No one can imagine the importance of our military potential as our military apparatus is not separate from our overall social fabric. Each of us is a fighting soldier. And when it becomes necessary to carry out the Holy War, each of us takes up his assignment in the fight in accordance with the injunctions of the Law, and that in the framework of the mission carried out under the tutelage of the Commanding Jurist.

Our Fight

The United States (US) has tried, through its local agents, to persuade the people that those who crushed their arrogance in Lebanon and frustrated their conspiracy against the oppressed (mustad'afin) were nothing but a bunch of fanatic terrorists whose sole aim is to dynamite bars and destroy slot machines. Such suggestions cannot and will not mislead our umma, for the whole world knows that whoever wishes to oppose the US, that arrogant superpower, cannot indulge in marginal acts which may make it deviate from its major objective. We combat abomination and we shall tear out its very roots, its primary roots, which are the US. All attempts made to drive us into marginal actions will fail, especially as our determination to fight the US is solid.

We declare openly and loudly that we are an umma which fears God only and is by no means ready to tolerate injustice, aggression, and humiliation. America, its Atlantic Pact allies, and the Zionist entity in the holy land of Palestine, attacked us and continue to do so without respite. Their aim is to make us eat dust continually. This is why we are, more and more, in a state of permanent alert in order to repel aggression and defend our religion, our existence, our dignity. They invaded our country, destroyed our villages, slit the throats of our children, violated our sanctuaries, and appointed masters over our people who committed the worst massacres against our umma. They do not cease to give support to these allies of Israel, and do not enable us to decide our future according to our own wishes.

In a single night the Israelis and the Phalangists executed thousands of our sons, women, and children in Sabra and Shatilla. No international organization protested or denounced this ferocious massacre in an effective manner, a massacre perpetrated with the tacit accord of America's European allies, which had retreated a few days, maybe even a few hours earlier, from the Palestinian camps. The Lebanese defeatists

accepted putting the camps under the protection of that crafty fox, the US envoy Philip Habib.

We have no alternative but to confront aggression by sacrifice. The coordination between the Phalangists and Israel continues and develops. A hundred thousand victims - this is the approximate balance sheet of crimes committed by them and by the US against us. Almost half a million Muslims were forced to leave their homes. Their quarters were virtually totally destroyed in Nab'a, my own Beirut suburb, as well as in Burj Hammud, Dekonaneh, Tel Zaatar, Sinbay, Ghawarina, and Jubeil - all in areas controlled today by the "Lebanese Forces." The Zionist occupation then launched its usurpatory invasion of Lebanon in full and open collusion with the Phalanges. The latter condemned all attempts to resist the invading forces. They participated in the implementation of certain Israeli plans in order to accomplish its Lebanese dream and acceded to all Israeli requests in order to gain power.

And this is, in fact, what happened. Bashir Jumayyil, that butcher, seized power with the help also of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries and the Jumayyil family. Bashir tried to improve his ugly image by joining the six-member Committee of Public Safety presided over by former President Elias Sarkis, which was nothing but an American-Israeli bridge borrowed by the Phalangists in order to control the oppressed. Our people could not tolerate humiliation any more. It destroyed the oppressors, the invaders and their lackeys. But the US persisted in its folly and installed Amin Jumayyil to replace his brother. Some of his first so called achievements were to destroy the homes of refugees and other displaced persons, attack mosques, and order the army to bombard the southern suburbs of Beirut, where the oppressed people resided. He invited European troops to help him against us and signed the May 17th, [1984] accord with Israel making Lebanon an American protectorate.

Our people could not bear any more treachery. It decided to oppose infidelity - be it French, American, or Israeli - by striking at their headquarters and launching a veritable war of resistance against the Occupation forces. Finally, the enemy had to decide to retreat by stages.

Our Objectives

Let us put it truthfully: the sons of Hizhallah know who are their major enemies in the Middle East - the Phalanges, Israel, France, and the US. The sons of our umma are now in a state of growing confrontation with them, and will remain so until the realization of the following three objectives:

(a) to expel the Americans, the French, and their allies definitely from Lebanon, putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land;
(b) to submit the Phalanges to a just power and bring them all to justice for the crimes they have perpetrated against Muslims and Christians;
(c) to permit all the sons of our people to determine their future and to choose in all the liberty the form of government they desire. We call upon all of them to pick the option of Islamic government which, alone, is capable of guaranteeing justice and liberty for all. Only an Islamic regime can stop any further tentative attempts of imperialistic infiltration into our country.

These are Lebanon's objectives; those are its enemies. As for our friends, they are all the world's oppressed peoples. Our friends are also those who combat our enemies and who defend us from their evil. Towards these friends, individuals as well as organizations, we turn and say:

> Friends, wherever you are in Lebanon... we are in agreement with you on the great and necessary objectives: destroying American hegemony in our land; putting an end to the burdensome Israeli Occupation; beating back all the Phalangists' attempts to monopolize power and administration. Even though we have, friends, quite different viewpoints as to the means of the struggle, on the levels upon which it must be carried out, we should surmount these tiny divergences and consolidate cooperation between us in view of the grand design.

We are an umma which adheres to the message of Islam. We want all the oppressed to be able to study the divine message in order to bring justice, peace, and tranquility to the world. This is why we don't want to impose Islam upon anybody, as much as we [sic] that others impose upon us their convictions and their political systems. We don't want Islam to reign in Lebanon by force as is

the case with the Maronites today. This is the minimum that we can accept in order to be able to accede by legal means to realize our ambitions, to save Lebanon from its dependence upon East and West, to put an end to foreign occupation and to adopt a regime freely wanted by the people of Lebanon.

This is our perception of the present state of affairs. This is the Lebanon we envision. In the light of our conceptions, our opposition to the present system is the function of two factors; (1) the present regime is the product of an arrogance so unjust that no reform or modification can remedy it. It should be changed radically, and (2) World Imperialism which is hostile to Islam.

We consider that all opposition in Lebanon voiced in the name of reform can only profit, ultimately, the present system. All such opposition which operates within the framework of the conservation and safeguarding of the present constitution without demanding changes at the level of the very foundation of the regime is, hence, an opposition of pure formality which cannot satisfy the interests of the oppressed masses. Likewise, any opposition which confronts the present regime, but within the limits fixed by it, is an illusory opposition which renders a great service to the Jumayyil system. Moreover, we cannot be concerned by any proposition of political reform which accepts the rotten system actually in effect. We could not care less about the creation of this or that governmental coalition, or about the participation of this or that political personality in some ministerial post, which is but a part of this unjust regime.

The politics followed by the chiefs of political Maronism through the "Lebanese Front" and the "Lebanese Forces" cannot guarantee peace and tranquility for the Christians of Lebanon, whereas it is predicated upon "asabiyya" (narrow-minded particularism), on confessional privileges, and on the alliance with colonialism. The Lebanese crisis has proven that confessional privileges are one of the principal causes of the great explosion which ravaged the country. It also proved that outside help was of no use to the Christians of Lebanon, just when they need it most. The bell tolled for the fanatic Christians to rid themselves of denominational allegiance and of illusion deriving from the monopolization of privileges to the detriment of other communities. The Christians should answer the appeal from heaven and have recourse to reason instead of arms, to persuasion instead of confessionalism.

To the Christians

If you, Christians, cannot tolerate that Muslims share with you certain domains of government, Allah has also made it intolerable for Muslims to participate in an unjust regime, unjust for you and for us, in a regime which is not predicated upon the prescriptions (ahkam) of religion and upon the basis of the Law (the Shari'a) as laid down by Muhammad, the Seal of the Prophets. If you search for justice, who is more just than Allah? It is He who sent down from the sky the message of Islam through his successive prophets in order that they judge the people and give everyone his rights. If you were deceived and misled into believing that we anticipate vengeance against you - your fears are unjustified. For those of you who are peaceful, continue to live in our midst without anybody even thinking to trouble you.

We don't wish you evil. We call upon you to embrace Islam so that you can be happy in this world and the next. If you refuse to adhere to Islam, maintain your ties with the Muslims and don't take part in any activity against them. Free yourselves from the consequences of hateful confessionalism. Banish from your hearts all fanaticism and parochialism. Open your hearts to our Call (da'wa) which we address to you. Open yourselves up to Islam where you'll find salvation and happiness upon earth and in the hereafter. We extend this invitation also to all the oppressed among the non-Muslims. As for those who belong to Islam only formally, we exhort them to adhere to Islam in religious practice and to renounce all fanaticisms which are rejected by our religion.

World Scene

We reject both the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] and the US, both Capitalism and Communism, for both are incapable of laying the foundations for a just society.

With special vehemence we reject UNIFIL [United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon] as they were sent by world arrogance to occupy areas evacuated by Israel and serve for the latter as a buffer zone. They should be treated much like the Zionists. All should know that the goals of the Phalangists regime do not carry any weight with the Combatants of the Holy War (i.e., the Islamic resistance). This is the quagmire which awaits all foreign intervention.

There, then, are our conceptions and our objectives which serve as our basis and inspire our march. Those

who accept them should know that all rights belong to Allah and He bestows them. Those who reject them, we'll be patient with them, till Allah decides between us and the people of injustice.

The Necessity for the Destruction of Israel

We see in Israel the vanguard of the United States in our Islamic world. It is the hated enemy that must be fought until the hated ones get what they deserve. This enemy is the greatest danger to our future generations and to the destiny of our lands, particularly as it glorifies the ideas of settlement and expansion, initiated in Palestine, and yearning outward to the extension of the Great Israel, from the Euphrates to the Nile.

Our primary assumption in our fight against Israel states that the Zionist entity is aggressive from its inception, and built on lands wrested from their owners, at the expense of the rights of the Muslim people. Therefore, our struggle will end only when this entity is obliterated. We recognize no treaty with it, no cease fire, and no peace agreements, whether separate or consolidated.

We vigorously condemn all plans for negotiation with Israel, and regard all negotiators as enemies, for the reason that such negotiation is nothing but the recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist occupation of Palestine. Therefore we oppose and reject the Camp David Agreements, the proposals of King Fahd, the Fez and Reagan plan, Brezhnev's and the French-Egyptian proposals, and all other programs that include the recognition (even the implied recognition) of the Zionist entity.

spokesman, Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin read the Program at the al-Ouzai Mosque in west Beirut and afterwards it was published as an open letter "to all the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World." It should be emphasized that none of Hizballah's web sites have published the full text of the organization's program, and they prefer to publish the 1996 electoral program which was intended for the specific propaganda campaign before the Lebanese Parliamentary elections in 1996.



Hizballah Organization Chart (added)

The Jerusalem Quarterly, number Forty-Eight, Fall 1988

This is a slightly abridged translation of "Nass al-Risala al-Maftuha allati wajahaha Hizballah ila-l-Mustad'afin fi Lubnan wa-l-Alam", published February 16, 1985 in al-Safir (Beirut), and also in a separate brochure. It carries the unmistakable imprint of Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the Hizballah mentor, and is inspired by his book Ma'maal-Quwma fi-l-Islam (Beirut 1979). See also his article in al-Muntalak (Beirut), October 1986.

Endnote:

[1] This paragraph did not appear in the original translation published by the Jerusalem Quarterly. It is possible that this omission is due to the fact that the source (al-Safir) for the translation did not include this text, which appears in the original Hizballah Program. The original Program was published on 16 February 1985. The organization's

Road to War

MAJ Sharon Tosi Moore, USAR

> **"We did not think, even one percent, that the capture would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July 11 ... that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not."**
> -Hezbollah Leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah in an interview with Lebanon's NTV Television Station

On 17 July 2006, Israel shocked the world by launching a ground attack into southern Lebanon against Hezbollah forces that had kidnapped two Israeli soldiers just five days earlier. A botched rescue attempt, followed by several days of air-strikes and an ignored deadline, failed to convince Hezbollah leaders that Israel was not going to negotiate as in the past. Israel, for reasons that are still not clear to the rest of the world, decided it had had enough and initiated a ground assault. Hezbollah, as surprised as the rest of the world, soon found itself fighting for its very existence in a brutal 33 day battle.

While Israel has been in conflict with its neighbors since its founding, from 1948-1968 the Israeli-Lebanon border was relatively quiet. It was not until the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) established itself in Lebanon in 1970 that systemic and organized cross border attacks from the Lebanese side began. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) often responded in kind, but events rarely escalated beyond the initial exchange of fire.

Of course, there were times when the pattern was broken and Israel responded to PLO provocations with a much greater force than the PLO came to accept as typical and survivable. One notable example was in 1978, when Fatah forces highjacked two Israeli buses—killing 37 and wounding 76. After several years of large scale Arab attacks (1970 school bus attack; 1972 Lod Airport massacre; and 1974 Kiryat Shimon and Maalot attacks, and others), this proved to be the final straw on the back of Israeli patience. In response to the massacre on the hijacked busses, Israel invaded southern Lebanon and pushed the PLO to the Litani River before withdrawing. Afterwards, the United Nations (UN) created a security zone patrolled by international forces, which unfortunately did little to end the cycle of attack and retaliation.

However, after the 1982 assassination attempt by a Palestinian group left the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom paralyzed, Israel again attacked Lebanon, determined to end the PLO threat from that country once and for all. This time Israel did not cease its assault until the PLO completely withdrew from Lebanon. Upon the PLO's withdrawal Israel established a new security zone along the Lebanon-Israel border, in which they maintained a heavy military presence. While the PLO was effectively destroyed in Lebanon, their departure left a power void which was soon filled by Hezbollah, a Syrian-backed terrorist group which took control of southern Lebanon.

While Israeli dealings with the PLO were generally contentious, the same was not originally true of its dealings with Hezbollah. Immediately after Hezbollah's 1982 rise to power, Israeli forces achieved what amounted to a tacit understanding with them as to what constituted acceptable actions for each side. In practice, Hezbollah generally confined its attacks to Israeli security forces, and Israel refrained from attacking Lebanese civilians. Even kidnappings followed a predictable pattern: Hezbollah forces grabbed a victim, the IDF responded with an air attack and some show of force, sometimes with raids and snatches of its own, and after awhile the two sides negotiated a settlement – usually a prisoner exchange. Things continued in this fashion even after Israel withdrew from the security zone in 2000. Because of this history, when Hezbollah declared 2006 as the "year of the prisoners" Israel did not react with undue alarm.

Israel's 2000 withdrawal from its Lebanese security zone had created a dilemma for Hezbollah. On one hand, Hezbollah became the first Arab terrorist group to achieve its stated goal, something which increased its stature both in Lebanon and in the wider Middle East. On the other hand, the Lebanese government allowed Hezbollah to remain armed only as long as its operations focused on resisting Israeli occupation. In order to justify its continued armed existence, Hezbollah shifted its focus to operations against Israeli forces in the Shebaa Farms regions of Gaza and on freeing Lebanese detainees from Israeli prisons. The Lebanese government provided tacit approval of this

new focus by not deploying Lebanese troops to the border region in Southern Lebanon, thus allowing Hezbollah to retain its undisputed control of the region. This allowed Hezbollah to concentrate its resources to attacks on Israel and add the Shebaa Farms district as an additional front.

The Shebaa Farms is a small area, about six miles long and two miles wide consisting of 14 farms, located on the border between Lebanon and the Golan Heights. Syria and Lebanon have disputed ownership of this territory since 1923, when French administrators failed to properly demarcate the border in that region, causing

Shebaa Farms

problems with several border villages. While maps showed the region as part of Syria, many local farmers identified themselves as Lebanese and even paid taxes to Lebanon. In 1964, a joint Syrian-Lebanese committee recommended that the international border reflect the area as Lebanon, but neither country adopted the recommendations. It was not until Israel captured the region in the 1967 War that Lebanon, who was not a party in the war, claimed ownership of the Shebaa Farms and demanded Israel withdraw, but to no avail. Since the United Nations (UN) recognized the area as part of Syria, not Lebanon, it did not require the Israeli troops to leave. After Israel attacked Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, Lebanon once again stepped up its claims to the area and maintained that Israel was in violation of the UN resolutions as long as IDF troops remained in the Shebaa Farms. In 1981, Israel unilaterally annexed the region as part of the Golan Heights, but this was not recognized by the United Nations.

Syria, on the other hand, has vacillated over the ownership of the region, depending on the political environment. Since Syria did not consider Lebanon a separate country, its government saw no reason to pursue a formal demarcation prior to 2000. After Israel's withdrawal to the UN-mandated "Blue Line," Syria used the Shebaa Farms region as a justification for continued occupation of Lebanon and attacks on Israel. Syria then declared that the Shebaa Farms were indisputably part of Lebanon and demanded Israeli withdrawal. Of course, despite these declarations, the Syrian government has since refused all attempts to formally cede the territory to Lebanon.

The United Nations has consistently viewed the region as part of Syria, not Lebanon. A spokesman for the UN announced in 2000 that "no one disputed that the village of Shebaa itself was in Lebanon, but most of the farms fell into an undefined area that may be either Lebanon or Syria."[1] Citing 16 different maps officially showing the area as Syria that were issued by the two countries since 1966, the UN has adopted the line drawn after the 1974 Yom Kippur war as the "Blue Line" in Shebaa.

Seizing an opportunity to open a second front on 21 May 2000, just days before Israel completed its United Nations-approved withdrawal from Lebanese territory, Hezbollah launched the first of its attacks from the Shebaa Farms region, marking the beginning of this new border dispute. In 2001, Rafiq Hariri, the Lebanese Prime Minister, told a United States congressional committee Hezbollah's attacks on Israeli troops in the Shebaa Farms region were as justified as "France's resistance to Nazi Germany's occupation."[2]

These mortar attacks were just the beginning of Hezbollah's renewed opposition to Israel. Just months after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah forces kidnapped and killed three Israeli soldiers, later returning their bodies in 2004 in an exchange for 400 Lebanese prisoners. This was followed by a sporadic stream of bombings, rocket attacks, and sniper fire, which continued for the next six years, resulting in the deaths of at least 17 Israelis. Even further Israeli concessions, such as its September 2005 pullout from Gaza, did nothing to halt the attacks. This continuous stream of violent attacks even prompted the UN to call on the Lebanese government to "double its efforts in

order to ensure an immediate halt to serious violations of the Blue Line."[3]

The actions leading up to the 2006 war initially began up north in Gaza, not in Lebanon. After months of escalating rocket and artillery fire, on 10 June Hamas formally withdrew from a 16-month ceasefire. A couple of weeks later, Israeli commandos launched a raid into Gaza, capturing two suspected Hamas operatives. This raid was the first since the Israeli pullout nine months prior. In retaliation, Hamas attacked an Israeli border post and captured an Israeli soldier. Then, within days, Israel mobilized thousands of IDF soldiers and launched Operation Summer Rains into southern Gaza to free Corporal Gilad Shalit. While IDF troops moved around looking for the kidnapped soldier, Palestinian forced captured and killed a young Israeli farmer on the West Bank. IDF forces immediately swept through the south and arrested 64 Hamas officials. When Hamas demanded the release of 1,000 Arab prisoners as the terms for cease-fire, Israel refused and the battle resumed.

With IDF forces distracted in the north, Hezbollah launched several unsuccessful attempts to kidnap Israeli military personnel. Finally, on 12 July, after meticulously coordinated rocket, anti-tank missile, mortar, and sniper attacks along the border, 20 Hezbollah fighters attacked a patrol of two Humvees from Division 91. They succeeded in capturing two reserve soldiers, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, and killing three others. The operation, which Hezbollah leaders termed Operation True Promise, was designed to get an Israeli reaction and allow Hezbollah to flex their muscles. At first, all seemed to go according the Hezbollah's plans.

The IDF reacted instantaneously and launched a platoon across the border to rescue the soldiers. This marked the first time in six years that Israeli conventional forces had set foot in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah had anticipated the rescue effort and the platoon drove into a carefully laid trap and was met by a wall of small arms and antitank missile fire. In the midst of the running battle, an Israeli tank struck a pre-positioned explosive device killing four IDF soldiers. Another soldier was killed in the fighting later in the day. These eight total deaths represented the highest number of Israeli casualties in more then four years.

The failed rescue attempt convinced Hezbollah leaders that they had the upper hand and Israel would negotiate as it had in the past. Within an hour, the Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, proclaimed on the Hezbollah television network, Al-Manar, that Hezbollah had indeed captured the Israelis, but that he had no intention of starting a war. He declared, "No military operations will return them…the prisoners will not be returned except through one way: indirect negotiations and a trade."[4] Hezbollah supporters danced in the streets, celebrating the anticipated release of their prisoners held in Israeli jails, which they were confident would be soon. However, they were wrong.

Rather than negotiate, Israel launched air strikes at a variety of Hezbollah targets across southern Lebanon, including command posts, bases, and bridges. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, also announced that not only were the kidnappings an act of war, but that he viewed them as "not a terror attack, but an act by a sovereign state which attacked the state of Israel without reason or provocation,"[5] thus holding the government of Lebanon responsible for Hezbollah's acts. The IDF Chief of Staff threatened to "turn back the clock in Lebanon by 20 years" if the Israeli soldiers were not released.[6]

Panicked, the Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, appealed first to the United Nations to prevent an Israeli attack, and then pleaded with a Nasrallah aide to release the soldiers. The aide assured him that the border would calm down in a couple of days and that nothing would interfere with the upcoming "tourist season," which was vital to Lebanon's continued economic recovery. Nevertheless, Siniora declared to the media that his government was not responsible for the kidnappings, nor did it endorse the actions in any way.[7]

To Hezbollah's surprise, Israel immediately turned its attention away from Gaza and the Northern Commander, Major General Udi Adam, who controlled all Israeli operations in Lebanon, announced a full scale invasion of Lebanon in order to break Hezbollah's military power. He declared that everything in Lebanon was a legitimate target and that Israel would hit from land, sea, and air. In what was codenamed "Operation Change of Direction,"[8] the IDF launched over 100 sorties against more then 30 targets throughout Lebanon, including bridges, roads, and the Beirut airport. The Israeli Air Force also dropped leaflets on Lebanese neighborhoods warning the inhabitants to stay away from places frequented by Hezbollah since Israel would be bombing those positions.

Hezbollah forces responded in kind and lobbed rockets and mortars across the border in over 60 attacks in the next 24 hours. After Israeli warplanes destroyed his Beirut office, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah declared open war against Israel and mobilized his forces, an estimated 15,000 strong. However, Nasrallah still denied all responsibility for the war, stating on Al-Jazeera television (TV) that despite kidnapping the IDF soldiers, "we were not the ones who began the war or the ones who launched a large-scale war…we were patient in the hope that things would stop at this point because we do not want to take our country to war."[9]

Additionally, Nasrallah announced that he had evidence of a planned Israeli attack in September or October, and that Hezbollah had acted pre-emptively in order to deprive Israel of the element of surprise. Although there is no evidence of such a plan, Israeli leaders have hinted that they were looking for a politically viable reason to attack Hezbollah and permanently drive it off the border.

The Israeli invasion stunned the Hezbollah, who had no inkling that their almost routine kidnapping would shatter a decades-long pattern of limited Israeli responses to provocation. As Nasrallah admitted in an interview on Lebanese TV immediately after the war, "We had not foreseen, not even to one-hundredth, that the hostage taking would lead to a war of that scope. Why? Because of several decades of experience, and because we know how the Israeli acts, it was not possible that a reaction to a hostage taking reaches such proportions, especially in the middle of tourist season."[10]



At the beginning of the war, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced Israel's intention was not only to free the kidnapped soldiers, but also to destroy Hezbollah's military capabilities and force the Lebanese government to take control of their country once and for all. Hezbollah, while unprepared for the attack, quickly shifted its goals from a prisoner exchange to something much simpler: survive the invasion and make Israel bleed as much as possible in the process.

Endnotes:

[1] "In focus: Shebaa farms", BBC News, 25 May 2000. Retrieved 26 November 2007.
[2] Gary C. Gambill, "Syria and the Shebaa Farms Dispute," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 2001.
[3] "Behind the Headlines: The Second Lebanon War – One Year Later," Israel Ministry if Foreign Affairs, 12 July 2007. Retrieved 26 November 2007.
[4] AP(Beirut)"Hezbollah captures two Israeli soldiers, sparking Israeli bombardment," 12 July 2006, 1546 GMT.
[5] AP(Beirut)"Hezbollah captures two Israeli soldiers, sparking Israeli bombardment," 12 July 2006, 1546 GMT.
[6] CBS News, "Israel Bombs Foreign Ministry in Lebanon," 12 July 2006.
[7] Anthony Shadid, "Inside Hezbollah, big miscalculations; Militia Leaders caught off guard by scope of Israel's response in War," *Washington Post*, 8 October 2006, p. A1.
[8] Global Security.org website, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/lebanon-change-of-direction.htm
[9] Transcript of interview with Hassan Nasrallah on Al-Jazeera, 20 July 2006. retrieved 26 November 2007.
[10] Interview with Hassan Nasrallah transcript. Lebanese NTV, 27 August 2006.

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2006 Lebanon War: An Operational Analysis

Major Sharon Tosi Moore

> ***"Hezbollah is not your father's terrorist organization. This is not a group of loosely affiliated cells of would-be hijackers or suicide bombers. Hezbollah is a terrorist army, trained like an army, organized like an army, funded and equipped like an army"*** Israeli officer's assessment of the Hezbollah after the July 2006 war[1]

When troops of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) crossed the Israel-Lebanon border to rescue two of their kidnapped soldiers and disarm Hezbollah, they encountered an enemy force diametrically different from the one they had faced in the past. Flush with funding from Syria and Iran, Hezbollah had used the six years since Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon to greatly enhance its military capabilities in southern Lebanon.

Not only was Hezbollah better supplied, but it had developed a superb training, planning, and organizational structure. This new militia now possessed a formal military structure, with tactical offensive capability and well-prepared defenses to a degree not previously seen in guerrilla forces. Because this hybrid guerrilla/conventional force was perceived to have won both a tactical and operational victory over the IDF, the organization, tactics, and techniques used by Hezbollah will likely spread to other non-state militia. It is therefore important that military planners have at least some grounding in the techniques employed by both sides in the 2006 war to determine which of these were successful.

Hezbollah Forces and Tactics

Hezbollah's military arm, the Islamic Resistance Movement, shares its name with Hamas, although the two are distinct entities. All military decisions for the militia are made by the Jihad Council, which is chaired by Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, who also leads the Hezbollah political wing. Hezbollah's high command is located in Beirut, with three other territorial commands covering the rest of southern Lebanon: Nasr Command, operating south of the Litani River; Badr Command, operating north of the Litani River and south of Beirut; and Beqaa Command, operating in the Beqaa Valley and in charge of training and logistics. In addition, Hezbollah has special forces, rocket, and unmanned aerial vehicle units, as well as air defense and naval elements, spread throughout southern Lebanon.

It is difficult to get an accurate count of Hezbollah military forces, since regular forces are few and their fighters hard to identify. Israeli intelligence estimated that at the time of the July War, Hezbollah forces comprised approximately 3,000 regular forces and 10,000 to 12,000 reservists. The regular militia was highly trained (often in Syria or Iran), well equipped, and disciplined. However, the reservists were given minimal training, except in the use of antitank weapons. Their great asset to Hezbollah was their knowledge of local terrain and their ability to blend into the local population.

In addition to the regular forces and reservists, approximately 8,000 to 20,000 members of "village" guard units, made up of local militia fighters from non-Hezbollah groups such as Amal and the Lebanese Communist Party, fought alongside Hezbollah. These local forces presented a special problem for the attacking IDF. They operated in familiar territory, using prepared and presupplied fighting positions that enabled them to maneuver quickly around villages. As Hezbollah leaders identified Israeli objectives, these locals were able to quickly reinforce the targeted villages, block access road, and ambush choke points. Often, Israeli troops would secure a village but then find themselves cut off by Hezbollah antiarmor teams that had infiltrated into their rear.

Also, for the first time, Hezbollah relied on a high degree of decentralization to allow its units the flexibility needed to react to IDF movements. Their ability to operate and maneuver independently was greatly enhanced by to prestocked "bases" spread out over 130 villages. To manage these bases, the regular militia was divided into teams of 50 men or fewer, each responsible for two to three villages. Approximately 100 to 200 reservists or locals augmented each team.

These small groups were then clustered into sectors of approximately 12 to 15 villages, and each sector was virtually independent with its own subunits to conduct logistic and engineering operations as well as complex defenses in depth. The main mission of these units was to slow the Israeli advance while inflicting as many casualties as possible.

Hezbollah's defenses were like nothing Israeli troops had seen before. Hezbollah had spent six years building an underground defense system comprising more than 600 subterranean structures—some as close as 800 meters to the Israel-Lebanon border, known as the Blue Line.[2] Most of these structures were built in and around densely populated areas, with others situated in heavily wooded areas known as "nature preserves."

Hezbollah did not fight a static war from these tunnels but rather employed an organized mobile battle plan. Its fighters could hide in, maneuver through, and fight from dozens of prepared battle positions, sophisticated supply bunkers, and complex tunnels dug both inside the villages and into the hillsides. These positions were so well hidden that IDF soldiers did not discover them until they had occupied the area.[3]

In addition, Hezbollah forces were extremely well trained, especially in the use of antitank weapons and rockets. Hezbollah fighters had used their years of relative peace not only to train on these weapon systems but to put together a well-developed doctrine for their use. Israeli forces were stunned when they were subjected to more than 500 antitank engagements—most of them at 800 to 850 meters and sometimes delivered in volleys from multiple locations. Hezbollah antitank gunners' choice of ranges, angles of attack, and warhead type indicated that they well understood the vulnerabilities of Israeli armor.

In the same vein, Hezbollah had great success deploying short-range rockets into Israel throughout the war.[4] These rockets were a large part of Hezbollah's operational plan. Although Israeli precision air strikes destroyed the vast majority of Hezbollah's medium- and long-range rockets in the first 24 hours of the war, they were unable to halt the continuous stream of short-range rockets that rained on Israeli towns. Throughout the conflict, Hezbollah fired an average of 150 to 180 rockets per day from its seemingly unlimited supply, even launching 250 the day before the cease-fire. In all, Hezbollah fired more than 3,500 rockets, and Israeli intelligence estimated that it possibly had another 10,000 to 20,000 hidden in caches.

However, the rocket barrages did not have the effect that Hezbollah had hoped for. The attacks did not break Israeli will—in fact, Israeli morale actually increased during the period of the rocket attacks. Nor did the rockets cause mass casualties. Thanks to a well-developed civilian defense plan, more than 250,000 Israelis moved into shelters; only 43 Israeli civilians were killed, including four who died of heart attacks during rocket attacks, and fewer than 4,300 injured.[5]

All told, although Hezbollah was unexpectedly strong and well disciplined, its units were not without deep flaws. Hezbollah in general was relatively unprepared for the magnitude of Israeli response and would have been hopelessly overmatched had Israel unleashed the full extent of its capabilities. In addition, the small disbursed Hezbollah units were often unable to support one another and proved unable to operate outside their local areas. Despite modern communications equipment, including cell phones, Hezbollah units were isolated and often did not know what adjacent forces were doing. Finally, when engaged in direct combat, Israeli forces consistently prevailed, killing more than 600 Hezbollah fighters,[6] more then six times the losses sustained by the IDF.

Israeli Forces and Tactics

Total Israeli ground forces dwarf the size of Hezbollah. On paper, Israel has about 125,000 active duty and 330,000 reservists divided among 18 divisions. The Israeli Air Force has 19 combat squadrons and approximately 32,500 active and 54,000 reserve airmen. The Navy has more than 70 combat vessels and around 10,000 sailors. The IDF has four regional commands: Northern Command, responsible for the borders with Lebanon and Syria; Central Command, responsible for the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Jordan border; Southern Command, in charge of the Egyptian borders and Gaza region; and Home Front Command, which oversees internal civilian defense.

All of the IDF were under the command of the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, the first Air Force officer ever to serve as Chief of Staff.[7] Under his command, the IDF adopted a new operations doctrine that advocated airpower as its

major means of battle, with ground fighting as a last resort. This doctrine has been referred to as the "Kosovo model," and critics fault its "aerial arrogance," which resulted in cuts to ground forces in order to beef up aerial capabilities. Another key negative factor was that the concept of military success was ignored and replaced by a doctrine that aimed "to recognize the rationale of the opponent system and create an 'effects-based' campaign consisting of a series of 'physical and cognitive appearances' designed to influence the consciousness of the enemy rather than destroying it."[8]

Israeli forces had not fought a ground war in more than 20 years. The typical infantry unit mostly prepared for such missions as manning checkpoints and conducting house raids on known terrorists. Meanwhile, the maneuver training that was conducted was done in the wide-open desert near Gaza. While this terrain was perfectly suited to the high-speed armor maneuvers that previously defined Israeli operations, the maneuver training focused on low-intensity conflict skills, resulting in the atrophy of those needed in high-intensity conflict, especially combined arms integration. Adding to the degradation of capabilities, the IDF operational tempo and budget cuts in the three years prior to the 2006 conflict had prevented forces from conducting any real training at the battalion, brigade, and division levels, and some IDF units that depended on reserve augmentation had never trained with their augmentees.

When Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced his intention to send ground troops into Lebanon to rescue Israel's kidnapped soldiers and crush Hezbollah, it was up to the Northern Commander, Major General Udi Adam, and his two active and three reserve divisions to execute the plan. At the time, Maj. Gen. Adam had only five operational brigades immediately available for the attack. Furthermore, IDF commanders did not alert the government of this shortage, nor did the leadership demand, as was necessary under its own plans, early mobilization of the reserves so that they could be properly equipped and trained in advance of a ground attack.

It is possible that this seemingly egregious oversight was merely a result of no one anticipating the need for reservists. Planners had estimated that the IDF would need only nine to ten weeks to carry out the plan—"two weeks to focus on counterbattery fire followed by a six to eight week ground operation."[9] Even IDF Ground Forces Commander Major General Benjamin Gantz estimated that "[b]etween week two and week nine, we wouldn't have faced significant warfare on our homefront, which would have allowed us to focus on eradicating Hezbollah's efforts to threaten Israel."[10] This was compounded by Prime Minister Olmert's adamant insistence that any military goals were subordinate to the larger diplomatic and political goals, so that any ground campaign had to make every effort to minimize risks and to use the smallest footprint possible. Bolstered by Lt. Gen. Halutz's confidence in his new doctrine, the plan relied on precision air strikes, as opposed to an overwhelming ground attack, to destroy Hezbollah strongholds and equipment.[11]

The Initial Attack

Israel's first step of the plan was to impose a complete blockade of Lebanon, followed by the bombing of any target deemed a "support base" for Hezbollah, with the exception of water and electrical facilities. Israeli resolve to conduct ground operations increased after Hezbollah hit an Israel warship, the INS *Hanit*, on 14 July, killing four sailors and severely damaging the vessel, and after it ignored a 15 July deadline to cease rocket attacks and release the kidnapped soldiers. On 19 July, after several days of air strikes, artillery fire, and feints along the border, during which time Hezbollah launched more than 700 Katuysha rockets into Israel, IDF ground troops finally entered Lebanon near the town of Maroun al-Ras, formally launching "Operation Change of Direction."

In keeping with the Prime Minister's policy of a small footprint, most of the combat was conducted by only two division task forces: the 162nd Armored Division (Plada), which had the 933rd Brigade (Nahal) and the 401st Armored Brigade, and the 91st Territorial Infantry Division, which had the 35th Parachute Brigade, the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Golani), the 300th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, the 609th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, and the 7th Armored Brigade.[12] These were further broken down into battalion- and company-sized teams. The 91st spearheaded the first operations across the border, while the 162nd slowly moved north along the border to make the push to the Litani River. All total, the IDF deployed less than 10 percent of its total forces, about 30,000 ground troops, although there were never more than 10,000 Israeli soldiers in Lebanon at any given time.

Once committed, IDF tanks maneuvered independently, with little support from dismounted infantry, attack helicopters, or fixed-wing close air support. Individual brigades conducted operations in a vacuum, with little consideration or understanding of how their attack fit into the grand scheme of maneuver. Even after the reality of the situation on the ground set in, IDF leadership failed to adapt the military way of operation and its goals to the reality on the ground. Commanders were not given input or control of the joint force, and the Northern Commander, who was ostensibly in charge, could not call in air force or navy support, nor did he control their assets. As the short-range rockets fell on Israel, the army and the air force argued over which service was responsible for defeating them. Relations between the Northern Commander and the Chief of Staff became so acrimonious that halfway through the war, the Chief of Staff sent his deputy to "oversee and coordinate" with the Northern Command staff—an unprecedented move in the middle of a war.[13]

The Battlefield

> ***"Three differences stand out with Hizballah: its ability to maneuver tactically against the IDF, the autonomy given to its small units and the initiative taken by the small-unit leaders, and the skill Hizballah displayed with its weapons systems."***
> Andrew Exum [14]

The Lebanon battlefield was mostly limited to southern Lebanon within a 50 × 50 kilometer zone, an area slightly smaller than Rhode Island. The terrain was filled with rugged mountains, rivers, and deep canyons, and punctuated by numerous small villages and towns. Heavy vegetation and forests in the countryside and the buildings and tunnels in urban areas provided numerous opportunities for dismounted infantry to hide from airborne sensors and weapons—very different from the open desert area in the Gaza where IDF forces had operated and trained for the past 20 years. As a final complication, the road networks could not support the armored vehicles, forcing the IDF to cut new roads or reinforce existing ones, both of which significantly slowed progress.

As they crossed the border, the Israeli units faced a well-organized defensive system. Hezbollah's Nasr unit, which was responsible for the area south of the Litani River, divided the region into three defensive sectors with a total of 39 villages. In addition to the tunnel system that crisscrossed the area, the five kilometer strip along the border was further divided into 176 killing zones of approximately three square kilometers each. These zones were protected with booby traps, land mines, and even closed-circuit television cameras. Furthermore, as required by its charter, the United Nations (UN) had its security forces dutifully report all Israeli violations of the Blue Line on its unclassified website, which enabled Hezbollah to watch every step of the advancing Israeli army.

The Israeli army did not conduct sweeping armor attacks with overwhelming firepower as it had in the past. Instead, it proceeded cautiously along a very narrow sector of attack. Units were dispersed, and there was no effort to conduct a combined arms attack. Because of the threat of improvised explosive devices, armored vehicles moved only if they were preceded by dismounted infantry conducting clearing operations. This slow advance opened the tanks to the threat of antitank guided missiles (ATGM).

Similarly, after a "friendly fire" incident brought down an Israeli helicopter, rotary-winged aircraft were prohibited from going ahead of the line of advance. Adding to the problems caused by the slow advance, the use of indirect fire was hampered by the decision to leave the division's artillery units on the Israeli side of the border. As well, many units had left behind their organic mortar assets to reduce weight. Finally, unit movement was limited to nighttime operations, with units often withdrawing to a safe area after achieving their nightly objective. In short, the IDF basically ceded the tactical advantage to Hezbollah.

Hezbollah's Secretary General Nasrallah acknowledged, "I never said that the Israelis cannot reach any place in southern Lebanon. Our dogma and strategy is that when they come they must pay a high price."[15] Understanding their inability to match Israel's overwhelming firepower, Hezbollah developed tactics to counter or negate that advantage. Once such technique was "swarming," which is "a deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to perform military strikes from all directions. It employs a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire that is directed from both close-in and stand-off positions. It will work best—perhaps it will only work—if it is designed mainly around the deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked maneuver units."[16] This tactic halted the IDF armored columns, forcing them to withdraw, regroup, and attack with infantry in the lead.

Because Hezbollah used local militiamen operating in familiar territory, it was able to surround and outmaneuver the Israelis, even under Israeli artillery and air attacks. Adding to the Israeli frustration, local fighters who withdrew went home, put their AK-47 under their beds, and put on civilian clothes, making it difficult for the IDF to identify who they were fighting. Hezbollah also had no compunction about using civilian structures, including schools and mosques, for cover. Sometimes, the Israelis felt that they were battling invisible combatants who had the "magical" ability to melt away and reappear.

"Nature Preserve" - Built up to 40 meters underground with large amounts of concrete and steel. Entrances and exits to the bunkers were blocked from direct fire by concrete barriers and steel blast doors. Additionally, they were not linear (to reduce effects of direct fire within the complex) and had blast deflectors (concave portions of the walls).

One of the biggest obstacles confronting the IDF was the "nature reserves." IDF artillery units were not allowed to target these reserves for the first week of battle. These fortified wooded areas near the border numbered between 40 and 60, some within meters of UN observation posts. Each contained a complex bunker system and served as a secure forward base. The bunkers were 40 to 50 meters below ground and included secure wire communications, living spaces with running water, observation posts, a munitions bunker (and two reserve munitions bunkers), and reinforced rocket, machine-gun, and ATGM positions.

The War

The first IDF objective was to take control of Maroun a-Ras, a small hilltop 1 kilometer north of the border. It took until 23 July for the IDF to declare the village captured, at the cost of 10 soldiers killed and more than 20 wounded. But even as the IDF turned its focus to the Hezbollah "capital" of Bint Jubayl, sporadic fighting continued in the village.

The IDF soon found that securing a village and its surrounding area proved difficult. Task forces often had to take the same village twice, as Hezbollah antiarmor teams infiltrated back into the rear of the IDF and accessed hidden caches to rearm. After rearming, these teams would return to their original positions and continued attacking IDF units. This disrupted the Israeli ability to resupply, since IDF logistics units moving forward found themselves under attack along supposedly clear routes. At times, the inability to move logistics forward left IDF task forces cut off from food and water for days.

Israel also found itself under attack from the international community for its aerial bombing of civilian infrastructure and its perceived "disproportionate, indiscriminate and excessive use of force."[17] When an Israeli shell hit a UN observer post, killing four international observers,[18] UN Secretary General Kofi Annan described the attack as deliberate. An international conference meeting in Rome, led by Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, urged an immediate cease-fire. Israel agreed as long as Hezbollah would disarm and return the kidnapped IDF soldiers. Hezbollah in turn countered that it

would only accept an immediate cease-fire and indirect prisoner exchange.

As talks continued, the IDF and Hezbollah continued to battle. After a 30 July IDF air strike killed 28 civilians in Qana, the site of a 1996 incident where an Israeli air strike killed 106 civilians in a UN compound, Israel agreed to a 48-hour suspension of air attacks. This temporary suspension allowed humanitarian aid to arrive. During that time, Israel urged the Lebanese government to take control of its country back from Hezbollah, telling the UN Security Council, "Is it now time that the Lebanese Army, which is there, acted in order to rid itself of the very beast which is bringing this horror and this destruction upon its people?"[19]

In the meantime, on 1 August, the IDF widened the ground offensive and began preparing to attack on three more fronts, utilizing the reserve units it had called up just days earlier. Two of these were in the south—Aiyt a-Shab and Marouhine—and the other was up north through the Wadi Saluki (so the IDF could push through to the Litani River). The 162nd Division, which was working its way north along the border, would lead that attack, cutting off Hezbollah escape routes and preventing resupply from Syria. Additionally, 13 commando detachments would operate deep inside Lebanon, attacking suspected Hezbollah headquarters and depots.

On 3 August, Secretary General Nasrallah offered for the first time to stop the rocket attacks if Israel would stop its air strikes. He then blamed the entire war on the United States, stating, "Olmert and his government are no more then tools in this war. I'd like to stress this by saying … the blood of all … that has been spilled in Lebanon stains the faces of Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Rumsfeld, and Cheney."[20] On the day he made this statement, Hezbollah fired 241 rockets into Israel, the highest single-day total to that point.

As Israel pressed forward from the south, the 162nd Division sat on the northern border, awaiting the command to push across to the Litani River. Israel made it clear that it would continue its offensive until an international force arrived to take over in southern Lebanon. By 6 August, Israel had attacked more then 4,600 targets in Lebanon, and Hezbollah had fired more than 2,500 rockets into Israel in retaliation.

On 12 August, just one day after Israeli forces finally started fighting through the Wadi Saluki, Hezbollah agreed to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which called for a cease-fire on 14 August. Israel agreed the next day and began withdrawing its forces. However, the final hours of the conflict saw some of the fiercest fighting of the war, with Israel conducting 178 air strikes and Hezbollah firing 250 rockets. On 14 August, at 0500 local time, the cease-fire went into effect. Israeli troops would remain in place until Lebanese and UN soldiers arrived to replace them.

The Aftermath

Both sides claimed victory. Secretary General Nasrallah appeared on television to proclaim, "We are facing a strategic and historic victory. This is no exaggeration. This is a victory for Lebanon—all of Lebanon—for the resistance, and for the entire Islamic nation."[21] The same day, Prime Minister Olmert stated, "IDF soldiers dealt a severe blow, the dimensions of which are not yet publicly known, to this murderous organization, its military and organizational infrastructure, its long term ability, the huge weapons arsenal … and also the self confidence of its people and leaders. In every battle, in every encounter with the Hezbollah terrorists, the fighters of the IDF had the upper hand—of this there is not doubt."[22]

The Prime Minister's statements notwithstanding, the Israeli military took it as a humiliating defeat. Israel had not achieved any of the lofty goals set out by the command; Hezbollah still stood, apparently undeterred, albeit somewhat degraded. After a flurry of blame shifting and command firings, most fingers pointed directly at the Prime Minister, for providing unachievable objectives while hamstringing of the military effort, and at the Chief of Staff, for espousing a flawed doctrine. Israeli Army leaders were so bitter at Lt Gen Halutz's perceived failure to support the ground troops' mission that a former chief of staff told him that he should be the first and last air force officer to ever command the IDF.

Almost immediately, the IDF began taking steps to correct identified deficiencies, such as placing intelligence cells on brigade and battalion staffs and utilizing new missile defense technologies. The Chief of Staff resigned five months after the end of the war and was soon followed by many other senior officers. The Winograd Commission, appointed in September 2006 to look into the preparation and conduct of the war, released a scathing initial report in April 2007, with a full report due in January 2008. More changes are sure to come as a result of the commission's findings.

One of the biggest critiques was that arrogance caused the IDF to abandon long-established battle principles. The IDF was guilty of the amateur error of underestimating its enemy, a miscalculation it is not likely to repeat. Although Hezbollah has remained fairly silent since the end of the war, there is no doubt that its leaders are rebuilding and preparing for another confrontation with Israel.

FINAL NOTE: As of November 2007, Hezbollah has not returned the Israeli soldiers whose kidnappings were the initial cause of the war.

Endnotes:

[1] US Army Training and Doctrine Command, "The 2d Israel-Lebanon War…a learning opportunity," May 2007.

[2] This marked the border between Israel and Lebanon established by UN Security Council Resolution 425.

[3] Critics of the war suggest that Israeli intelligence knew about these defenses but did not share the information with the Northern Commander or his staff because it was deemed "too sensitive" and they lacked the proper clearances.

[4] Short-range rockets are defined as those that could fire 11 to 18 kilometers into Israel

[5] By contrast, the Lebanese government reported that about 1,100 Lebanese civilians were killed and more than 4,400 wounded. These numbers are estimates because there is no way of knowing which casualties were truly innocent civilians and which were Hezbollah fighters.

[6] Hezbollah casualty estimates range from 250 (Hezbollah spokesmen) to more than 1,000 (Lebanese officials). The official Israeli estimate based on battlefield observation is about 600.

Uncovering a Hezbollah bunker adjacent to UN post

[7] Although Lieutenant General Haim Laskov was the commander of the Israeli Air Force before serving as Chief of Staff from 1958 to 1961, he was an armor officer, not a pilot.

[8] Haninah Levine, "Behind the Headlines on the Winograd Commission's Interim Report," Center for Defense Information, 29 May 2007.

[9] William M. Arkin, *Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War,* Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 2007, p. 41.

[10] "Interview: Maj Gen Benjamin Gantz, Commander, Israel Defense Forces' Army Headquarters," *Defense News*, August 2006, p. 38.

[11] Gary C. Gambill, "Implications of the Israel-Hezbollah War," *Mideast Monitor*, Vol. 1, No. 3, September–October 2006.

[12] Elements of two reserve divisions were eventually activated, but they did not see major combat operations: the 98th Parachute Division and the 366th Armored Division.

[13] Maj Gen Adam resigned soon after the war.

[14] Andrew Exum, "Andrew Exum and Nicholas Noe Debate Hizbullah's Summer War*," http://joshualandis.com/blog/?p=136, 6 January 2007.*

[15] Arkin, *Divining Victory*, p. 196.

[16] John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Swarming and the Future of Conflict*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, DB-311-OSD, 2000, p. vii.

[17] Arkin, *Divining Victory*, p. 201.

[18] One each from Austria, Canada, Finland, and China.

[19] Arkin, *Divining Victory*, p. 213.

[20] Transcript, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Al-Manar TV, 3 August 2006.

[21] Transcript, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Al-Manar TV, 14 August 2006.

[22] Transcript, Prime Minister Olmert's speech at the Knesset regarding the War in the North, 14 August 2006.

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Lebanon

OCHA Situation Report No. 1
Issued 20 July 2006

"Over 300 people have reportedly been killed (30% of which are children, according to UNICEF), and over 860 wounded."

OCHA Sitrep No. 1

The names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

SITUATION

Humanitarian situation worsening with widespread destruction of public infrastructure. Est. 500,000 conflict-affected people. Est. 115,000 Third Countries Nationals (TCNs) still in Lebanon. Humanitarian assessments impaired by insecurity and destroyed infrastructure. WFP ground teams estimate 1-3 month food supply, but supply chain almost completely disrupted.

ACTION

UNICEF conducting limited in-country assessments of temporary shelters for IDPs. UNHCR pre-positioning emergency shelter material in Jordan and Syria. UNIFIL providing humanitarian support but freedom of movement significantly restricted. OCHA deploying small coordination support team to work with UN Country Team. ICRC emergency supplies reached Lebanon on 18 July. ICRC and Lebanese Red Cross Society (LRC) active since first day of crisis. 500 emergency volunteers and 200 ambulances mobilized. Mobile clinics providing care to IDPs.

Datum: WGS84.
Map data sources: UN Cartographic Section, Schéma Directeur d'Aménagement du Territoire Libanais, Global Discovery, Arcworld, public media sources compiled by UNOSAT, World Aero Data.

ReliefWeb

Created by the ReliefWeb Map Centre
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
United Nations - 21 July 2006

Lebanon Situation Map on 19 July 2006

Lebanon

OCHA Situation Report No. 5
Issued 26 July 2006

"First UN aid convoy reaches South, UN peacekeeper deaths overshadow Rome meeting."

OCHA Situation Report No. 5



The names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Lebanon Situation Map on 26 July 2006

Harb Tammuz (The July War) 2006: A Timeline

MAJ Sharon Tosi Moore, USAR

The July War lasted for 33 days, during which Israel attacked Hezbollah forces in Lebanon along two main fronts. The 91st Territorial Division conducted operations along the southern border, thrusting north into Lebanon beginning 25 July 2006. In the meantime, the 162nd Armored Division moved north along the eastern border, eventually penetrating along the Al Adisa-Tyyibeb corridor towards the Litani River, beginning on 9 August.

18 July – Israeli ground troops enter southern Lebanon in order to destroy Hezbollah outposts. Hezbollah rockets hit a hospital in Galilee, wounding eight.

19 July – Seventy Lebanese civilians killed as Israeli forces push into Lebanon

21 July – Hezbollah rejects a United Nations (UN) plan to halt hostilities; Israel mobilizes thousands of Reservists and masses them on the border.

22 July – Israeli military seizes Maroun al-Ras and establishes its first foothold in the security buffer along the border. Hezbollah rockets fall in Haifa, Safed, Nahariya, Carmiel, and the area around Avivim.

25 July – The IDF begins assault of Bint Jbeil in southern Lebanon and launches airstrikes at targets in Tyre, Beirut, and Nabatiye. An Israeli bomb strikes a United Nations outpost near Khiyam, killing four U.N. observers. Hezbollah launches nearly 100 rockets into northern Israel.

26 July – Hezbollah fires more than 100 rockets into northern Israel, with several falling in the port city of Haifa. An Israeli airstrike destroys a 10-story building in Tyre and a transmission tower at a Lebanese army barracks north of Beirut. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) reports 50 Israeli deaths, including 31 soldiers, since fighting began. Lebanese security forces say 398 people in Lebanon have been killed.

29 July – Israel rejects UN call for three-day humanitarian cease-fire

30 July – Israel agrees to halt airstrikes on southern Lebanon for 48 hours to investigate a Sunday raid that killed more than 50 civilians in Qana, Lebanon.

1 August – Israeli troops deploy near the eastern Lebanese town of Baalbeck in the Beqaa Valley near Syria, the northernmost ground deployment thus far in the conflict.

2 August – Hezbollah pounds northern Israel with the largest rocket barrage of the conflict, hitting cities across northern Israel, including upper Galilee. Ten die in an Israeli raid on a Baalbeck hospital that the IDF claims is a Hezbollah headquarters.

3 August – Nasrallah stated, for the first time, that if Israel ceased aerial and artillery strikes of Lebanese towns and villages, Hezbollah would stop its rocket campaign. Lebanon security forces claim 900 Lebanese civilians killed and 3,000 wounded since fighting began. Israel reports 68 deaths, including 27 civilians.

4 August – Israel bombs the last land routes into Beirut, effectively cutting off the city from relief supplies. Israel also hits a power station, cutting off electricity to the Beqaa Valley and southern Lebanon. Hezballah launched 220 rockets into Israel, and one hits just 40 km from Tel Aviv.

6 August – IDF reenters Bint Jubayl. Lebanon rejects UN draft ceasefire.

7 August – The Israeli Air Force shot down an Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over Lebanese territory, apparently launched by Hezbollah. Lebanon calls up Reservists to deploy to the border. Lebanon offers its own peace plan that includes Israeli withdrawal, increased UN force presence, Lebanese Army deployment to southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah disarmament.

9 August – Kiryat Shmona becomes the first Israeli town evacuated in the history of Israel.

10 August – Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah vows to turn southern Lebanon into a "graveyard" for invading Israeli troops. The Israeli army pushes up to 10 kilometres into southern Lebanon just hours after Cabinet approves an extension of ground operations.

11 August – IDF forces begin a push to the Litani River through Wadi Saluki.

12 August – Twenty-four Israeli soldiers killed near Wadi Saluki in the worst Israeli loss in a single day. Five soldiers were killed when Hezbollah apparently shot down an Israeli helicopter, a first for the militia. Hezbollah agree to UN Resolution 1701, which calls for an end to fighting on 14 August.

13 August – Israel accepts UN Resolution 1701. Fierce fighting continues with Hezballah firing more than 200 rockets into Israel, and Israeli planes conduct air strikes on Beirut and southern Lebanon. Some Israeli soldiers begin withdrawing ahead of the deadline.



Sites attacked by Israel [Wikipedia]

Israeli Merkava Mark IV in Wadi Saluki [Wikipedia]

14 August – An official ceasefire comes into effect at 0500 GMT (0800 Lebanese time and 0900 UAE time), although seven Lebanese are killed by Israeli air strikes just minutes before the cease fire. Israeli troops begin to withdraw from the country although the government says some will remain there until the UN and Lebanese Army soldiers arrive in the south. Final official toll is 1,287 Lebanese killed and more then 4,400 wounded. Hezbollah Casualty estimates range from 250 to over 1,000. Israel suffers 119 IDF killed and about 450 wounded, as well as 43 civilians killed and almost 4,300 wounded.

Israeli sites hit by rocket attacks from Lebanon [Wikipedia]

The Battle of Bint Jubayl

Major Sharon Tosi Moore

Almost two weeks into the July War, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) had managed to push less than five kilometers into southern Lebanon and was gradually grinding its way forward. This slow, cautious movement was a complete reversal of the bold maneuver strikes the IDF employed in past conflicts. In place of fast-moving heavy armored forces capable of moving through contested areas with impunity, Israel had accepted a doctrine of slow movement and attrition. Slashing deep thrusts had been replaced by a "war of inches."

Some of this slow movement was a result of poor doctrine and some to training deficiencies. However, the key reason was that, unlike any previous enemy the IDF had fought, Hezbollah fighters were better organized, trained, and equipped; they were more disciplined than most Arab armies and certainly far superior to any other guerrilla force Israeli had encountered in its military history.

Hezbollah understood the Israeli way of war and planned its defenses to counter the IDF strengths. To negate Israeli speed, Hezbollah fighters littered the streets with improvised explosive devices, forcing Israeli vehicles into well-covered kill zones. Such tactics slowed IDF progress to a walking pace, since soldiers were forced to dismount their lightly armored vehicles and conduct clearing operations ahead of the tanks. To counter Israeli close air support (CAS), Hezbollah engaged IDF forces at such close range that helicopter gunship support was difficult to coordinate and often useless. This close-quarters fighting also made it difficult to properly support the advanced elements with artillery fire. Finally, to counter what had always been the IDF trump card—airpower—Hezbollah fighters went underground, patiently waiting for the Israeli forces to pass before emerging and surrounding them, a maneuver that confounded the IDF throughout the war.

The IDF discovered early in the war that Hezbollah fighters were operating from a series of underground bunkers, tunnels, and hidden firing positions. Not only had Hezbollah strongly reinforced these fighting positions, but it was also using them to execute an organized, mobile battle plan. As the fighting grew fiercer, Hezbollah fighters moved nimbly from tunnel to tunnel, often surrounding the Israeli forces. This slowed down the Israeli advance considerably, since the IDF had to clear these fighting positions before going forward. Because this tunnel system allowed Hezbollah forces to move back into areas behind Israeli lines, the IDF often found itself having to clear the same area several times. As a result, it took several days for the IDF to secure its initial main objective, the area along a small hilltop called Maroun al-Ras, which was equidistant from the Israeli border and Bint Jubayl, about 1 kilometer inside Lebanon.

Bint Jubayl, which means "daughter of the mountain" in Arabic, is a city of about 30,000 Shia Muslims and Christians. It was familiar terrain to the Israeli forces who had occupied it in 1978 and again during the 1982 to 2000 Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon. Since the Israeli withdrawal, however, it had become the Hezbollah "capital," serving as the operational and logistical hub for local militias and regular Hezbollah forces. Beyond that, it was the spiritual and psychological center for Hezbollah and its supports. This was the town where Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah held most of his press conferences and important speeches, as well as a parade after Israel's 2000 withdrawal. If Israel hoped to disrupt Hezbollah operations, the control of Bint Jubayl, and the high ground it commanded, would be key.

On 23 July, the IDF began a two-day bombardment of Bint Jubayl that eventually rained more than 3,000 shells on the city. On 25 July, IDF senior officers announced that they had surrounded the town and were in control. The 91st Division commander confidently told journalists, "The work is almost complete and the terrorists are fleeing."[1] The area was quiet, with little gunfire. However, several Hezbollah fighters remained in the town and were prepared to be patient and wait for the Israelis.

On 26 July, IDF commanders judged that Bint Jubayl was sufficiently softened up and sent in the Golani Brigade of the 91st Territorial Division to secure

the town. With two company strength formations, the brigade's lead elements moved into the town unmolested and began advancing into its narrow streets. After passing through approximately 15 houses, swarming Hezbollah teams struck from all directions, instantly killing or wounding a large number of IDF soldiers. The Hezbollah fighters had patiently waited in the upper stories of buildings until the IDF tanks were well inside the town before opening fire with guns and missiles. Thus began the largest battle of the war.[2]

For several hours, the Golani infantrymen battled the Hezbollah forces, sometimes at point-blank range. The fighting was so intense that Israeli soldiers could not evacuate their wounded for several hours. When evacuations finally began, Israeli soldiers had to carry the wounded three kilometers back, where helicopters could land only for a minute at a time, under cover of smoke grenades and a massive artillery barrage. It took more than six hours to complete the evacuations, and later that evening, IDF forces pulled back under cover of darkness. At the end of the day, the IDF had suffered nine killed and 24 wounded, the highest single-day total in the war. However, they also counted at least 40 dead Hezbollah fighters. The Golani commander estimated that the Israelis had faced approximately 100 Hezbollah fighters that day.[3]

The next day, reinforced by an airborne brigade, IDF forces reentered the city to engage a reconstituted Hezbollah contingent that was occupying the same buildings the Golani soldiers had cleared the day before. The IDF soldiers expressed surprise at the impressive Hezbollah combat capabilities, with one soldier noting, "They are strong fighters, not like us, but better than Hamas." [4]

By 27 July, the IDF forces had sealed off entry into the town in hopes of blocking Hezbollah's ability to reinforce its fighters. As the IDF troops patrolled the city streets, they took fire not only from houses but from mosques, hospitals, and schools. Hezbollah spokesmen did not deny the use of the mosques, telling the Associated Press, "What's the Israeli's business that our fighters were in the mosque? Maybe they were praying at the time!"[5] Even so, the IDF maintained its policy of not firing into mosques, and this self-imposed restraint hindered their ability to counter such actions.



The size and location of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) units on the map are estimates only. The map shows major IDF units that are reportedly involved in the conflict; it does not include all IDF units in the theater.

Rather then sweeping through Bint Jubayl with overwhelming force, the IDF committed just two brigades, while rest of the division spread across the southern border fighting in battalion and company-sized task forces. Because Hezbollah maintained a capability to reinforce the city at will, the IDF brigade commanders had a difficult time determining how many of the enemy they faced. Estimates ranged from 20 to more than 100.

Moreover, the narrow streets, seeded with improvised explosive devices and covered by direct fire ambushes, proved unsuitable for tanks, and the fighting soon devolved into close-range combat. Israeli forces were in the unaccustomed position of fighting street-to-street, and often room-to-room, in an attempt to clear buildings of an elusive enemy who often blended into the native population. While the Israeli

soldiers prevailed in direct contact, Hezbollah fighters continued to fight from the shadows, melting back into the population after hitting their selected targets.

During the day, IDF infantry directed counterbattery fire and CAS onto suspected enemy locations, both in the village and in the surrounding countryside, although effective Hezbollah antiaircraft fire often limited Israeli air support. The mission was further complicated by the presence of several hundred Lebanese civilians, which made it impossible for the IDF to call in CAS or indirect fire. While the Israeli CAS threat, combined with a ban on civilian vehicle traffic south of the Litani River, did force Hezbollah fighters to rely on stockpiles and prepositioned caches, it did little to lessen Hezbollah's immediate combat capabilities. Israeli forces estimated that Hezbollah had prepared one in every five to ten houses as either a fighting position or weapon cache. These prepositioned supply caches, coupled with the ability to reinforce positions at will, made Hezbollah nearly impossible to defeat with only a limited commitment of conventional forces.

Israeli forces finally responded with a "scorched earth" policy, and the weeks of Israeli air bombings reduced Bint Jubayl to a wasteland. An estimated 1,200 out of 1,500 buildings were destroyed, and the downtown area was completely flattened and littered with unexploded ordnance. There was no electricity or water, and residents who had remained were trapped. The two-day Israeli halt on air strikes (31 July–1 August) allowed the Red Cross and United Nations teams to survey the damage and assist with further evacuations.

IDF soldiers had pulled out of Bint Jubayl on 30 July, only to return on 6 August and resume the battle at a much lower level than before. Israeli forces were never able to fully pacify the city, and when the cease-fire took effect on 14 August, Hezbollah was still contesting the IDF for control. By that time, Bint Jubayl was in rubble and most of its residents had fled, but Hezbollah was still able to operate there and could declare victory.

In the time since the war nothing has refuted the image of a humiliating Israeli defeat. Soon afterward, Hezbollah forces erected a sign over the entrance to the city reading "Bint Jubayl—Capital of Freedom" and rechristened the city "Nasrallahgrad" in honor of the Hezbollah leader and the famed battle of Stalingrad, where the Soviets survived a long Nazi siege. Pictures of fallen Hezbollah fighters still adorn the marketplace. The Hezbollah legend of a small group of committed nationalists who stood up to the mighty Israeli military and forced them to withdraw has now become the accepted narrative of the war. This battle therefore became a perfect example of the IDF's ability to win every engagement, yet unable to obtain stated objectives, thus creating an image of defeat and failure.

Center of Bint Jbail after the war [Wikipedia]

Endnotes:

[1] Yaakov Katz, "8 soldiers killed in Battle of Bint Jbail," *Jerusalem Post*, 25 July 2006.

[2] Samir El-Khadem, *The War of Surprises and Deceptions: July 2006*, Beirut: Arab Institute for East and West Studies 2007, p. 55.

[3] Craig Smith, "Bint Jbeil Battle Proves Tough Testing Ground for Military," *The Age (Australia)*, 28 July 2007.

[4] Nir Hasson and Tomer Levi, "Wounded troops describe Bint Jbail battle as 'hell on earth'," *Haaretz*, 27 July 2006.

[5] Yaakov Katz, "IAF destroys Hizbullah's south Lebanon headquarters", *Jerusalem Post*, 26 July 2006.

About the Author:

Major Sharon Tosi Moore is a mobilized Army Reservist with the Joint Forces Command Joint Center for Operational Analysis. She currently serves as the JCOA liaison to the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, VA. In addition to her military duties, she is the author of numerous articles on military history and current events, the editor of an upcoming book "Fresh from the Fight", and a member of the US Naval Institute Editorial Board.

The Battle of Wadi Saluki

MAJ Sharon Tosi Moore

While the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 91st Division moved across the southern border from Israel into Lebanon, the Israeli government called up the 162nd Armored Division's (AD) 15,000 reservists and began massing them along Lebanon's eastern border. As battles continued to rage in Bint Jubayl and several other southern cities, the 162nd slowly made its way north along the eastern border. The unit's mobilization and movement took nearly two weeks, but by 28 August, the 162nd was overlooking Lebanon's Marjayoun District and waiting for the order to push across the border and occupy the village of Ghandouriyeh, which stood at the intersection of a major east-west route and the road leading to the key bridge over the Litani River. This would allow the IDF to cut off resupply routes from Syria and close the main escape route for Hezbollah fighters in the region.

To reach the village, the IDF had to cross through the village of Qantara and then through Wadi Saluki, an area covered with dense scrub and brush that naturally limited vehicles to the narrow road that crossed it. Steep limestone hills with myriad natural caves surrounded this road and overlooked the approach. In addition, terrain limitations prevented vehicles from bypassing the bridges that crossed the Saluki tributary. In short, the entire Wadi provided such an excellent choke point and such clear fields of fire for ambushing attacking forces that Hezbollah had established semipermanent defensive positions in the area. In fact, the area was so poorly suited for an offensive that a former United Nations (UN) commander remarked that "anyone dumb enough to push a tank column through Wadi Saluki should not be an armored brigade commander but a cook."[1]

Israeli troops had operated in Wadi Saluki before, and it was a place that held bitter memories. In August 1997, soldiers of the IDF Golani Brigade had set up a routine ambush when they were notified of six Hezbollah infiltrators in the area. Not only did IDF artillery fail to deter Hezbollah fighters, but the shelling ignited a brushfire that trapped and killed four Israeli soldiers. IDF commanders hoped for a different experience this time, especially after they were assured that the infantry soldiers from the Nahal brigade would clear out any Hezbollah fighters before the tanks crossed the valley.

South Litani River [Wikipedia]

For almost a week, the troops waited on the outskirts of the village of Metulla. Twice they received orders to attack, and twice, just as the tanks were ready to roll west, the IDF General Staff canceled the orders. This indecisiveness reflected a growing confusion among IDF senior leaders as to how best to prosecute the war, and it was during this time that the IDF Chief of Staff dispatched the Deputy Chief of Staff as a "special representative" to oversee the coordination of the air, land, and sea forces for the Northern Command. The Northern Commander, who was in charge of all the forces along the Lebanese border, took this as a direct insult. Even though the Northern Commander officially remained in command, this move sent ripples of uncertainty down the ranks as to who was coordinating the war; it also fed a growing general dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war.

While the Israeli forces dealt with command upheavals, Hezbollah forces did not sit idle. They

watched as the 162nd AD formations moved north and organized themselves for the attack west. As the Israeli tanks unexpectedly stood silent, Hezbollah took the opportunity to prepare for battle with the coming invaders. From the start, the Hezbollah fighters knew that the most likely avenue of attack west was through Wadi Saluki. As Israeli forces continued to wait for attack orders, Hezbollah moved approximately 100 guerrillas into the hills surrounding the only approach route. Not only did these fighters have a terrain advantage, but they were equipped with advanced Russian-made antitank guided missiles (ATGM), which could easily disable an Israeli tank and halt an attack.

On 11 August, both Israel and Hezbollah indicated that they were amenable to the cease-fire terms laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 1701, and it appeared that there would soon be a truce. However, that night, just before 5 PM, the Israeli General Staff finally gave the order to attack. Recognizing that his tanks were vulnerable to fire from the hills, and in accordance to the plan, the 162nd Division Commander ordered the Nahal Infantry Brigade to the high ground to his front to provide cover for the armored column below. The brigade quickly moved across the high ground and seized key buildings outside of Ghandouriyeh and Farun, declaring that the IDF controlled the high ground. However, nothing could have been further from the truth.

Perhaps under pressure to get the operation completed before the cease-fire, the division commander failed to confirm the veracity of this claim. Instead, just after 8 PM, he sent the 401st Armored Brigade into Wadi Saluki, straight into the Hezbollah kill zone.

As the tanks began their descent into the Wadi, the two lead vehicles were immediately hit by a volley of ATGMs. As the rest of the tanks rushed forward and began climbing the sheer slopes to the top of the gorge, all hell broke loose. Hezbollah fighters entrenched on the high ground fired hundreds of rockets at the trapped tanks. The Hezbollah forces had carefully studied Israeli tanks and, with help from Iranian advisors, were well aware of the vulnerable spots on the vehicles.

For the next 60 hours, the IDF faced some of the fiercest fighting of the war. As one 401st soldier stated, "We thought we were going into a lightly defended area … we found ourselves in a fiery hell."[2] Although the 401st Brigade Commander begged for indirect fire support, the Northern Command refused to use artillery or send helicopter gunships into the area because of the large number of dismounted IDF infantrymen present. Instead, the tanks were left to fend for themselves until they reached the top of the gorge and were able to storm the Hezbollah positions.

In the end, the two IDF brigades decimated the Hezbollah fighters, killing at least 80, but not before the guerrillas had inflicted serious damage on the attacking forces. Of the 24 tanks in the assault, 21 were damaged or destroyed, and 12 IDF soldiers (eight tankers and four infantrymen) were killed.

A young soldier involved in the battle later lamented, "The commanders told us that the infantry had already cleared the area, and then the tanks started getting hit, tank after tank. Why did they send us into this hell? Why did they send us into the missile trap? We already thought we were going to go home smiling and with the flags flying—instead, we go to our fellows' funerals."[3]

Finally, on 12 August, the IDF was able to conquer the high ground in Ghanouriyeh and synchronize its firepower for a coordinated attack. In the early morning of 13 August, the IDF soldiers succeeded in pushing through the Hezbollah defensive zone and prepared for the final thrust to the Litani River. However, they were ordered to halt operations in preparation for the general cease-fire the next morning. Instead of moving forward, the IDF units turned and moved back through the Saluki, giving up the hill they had fought so hard to capture.

For many, this operation was a perfect microcosm of all the mistakes made in the war. It appeared to be a senseless battle, launched just hours before the United Nations was set to approve the cease-fire. Even today, there has been no adequate reason provided for why the attack was ordered so late in the war, and opinions remain divided. Some senior IDF officers claim that it was launched in an effort to influence public opinion in Israel and in Lebanon ahead of the UN Security Council vote. Others thought that after weeks of slow, unsteady progress, the IDF wanted to prove that it could rapidly capture and hold ground. Still others believed that it was merely a show of force against Hezbollah. Whatever the reason, this battle and its losses did nothing to retrieve Israel's military reputation, and despite incurring severe losses, the attack did not significantly affect on the general military situation.[4]

As one junior leader succinctly summed up, "It should not have happened. We feel that this battle just should not have happened. Of course, we are soldiers and we fulfill every mission placed upon us, but when we look at what happened there and what surprises were waiting for us, we just were [expletive deleted]. We were caught unprepared."[5]

An Israeli Army outpost from the Lebanese side of the border in South Lebanon [Wikipedia]

Endnotes:

[1] Daniel Helmer, "Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for U.S. Forces Based on Israel's Operation Change of Direction," *Armor*, 1 January 2007.

[2] Interview with 401st Brigade soldier, by Eric Vardac, Center for Army Analysis Briefing, *Conflict in Southern Lebanon: The Ground Campaign,* 2006.

[3] Nava Tzuriel and Eitan Glickman, "The Canyon of Death," *Gush Shalom*, 16 August 2006.

[4]Yaakov Katz, "Wadi Saluki Battle—Microcosm of War's Mistakes," *Jerusalem Post*, 29 August 2006.

[5] Nava Tzuriel and Eitan Glickman, "The Canyon of Death," *Gush Shalom*, 16 August 2006.

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Israeli Soldiers entering South Lebanon [Wikipedia]

Israeli Sailors survey the coast of Lebanon during the blockade [Wikipedia]

Lebanon: Resolution 1701 (2006) adopted by the Security Council at its 5511th meeting, on 11 August 2006 (S/RES/1701)

Source: United Nations Security Council Date: 11 August 2006

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) 1680 (2006) and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17), of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time *emphasizing* the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and *encouraging* the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment of the Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, *welcoming also* its commitment to a United Nations force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and *bearing in mind* its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon,

Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest,

Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa farms area,

Welcoming the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of additional forces from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties,

Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a longterm solution to the conflict,

Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Calls for* a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;
2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, *calls upon* the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South and *calls upon* the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel;
3. *Emphasizes* the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon;
4. *Reiterates* its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;
5. *Also reiterates* its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized

borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

6. *Calls on* the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and *calls on* it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

7. *Affirms* that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and *calls on* all parties to comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;

8. *Calls for* Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a longterm solution based on the following principles and elements:

   – full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;

   – security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;

   – full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;

   – no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;

   – no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government;

   – provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;

9. *Invites* the Secretary-General to support efforts to secure as soon as possible agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and *expresses* its intention to be actively involved;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to present to the Security Council those proposals within thirty days;

11. *Decides*, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):

    (a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;

    (b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;

    (c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11(b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;

    (d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;

    (e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;

    (f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;

12. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist

it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, *authorizes* UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General urgently to put in place measures to ensure UNIFIL is able to carry out the functions envisaged in this resolution, *urges* Member States to consider making appropriate contributions to UNIFIL and to respond positively to requests for assistance from the Force, and *expresses* its strong appreciation to those who have contributed to UNIFIL in the past;

14. *Calls upon* the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel and *requests* UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11 to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;

15. *Decides* further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft:

    (a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories; and

    (b) The provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above; except that these prohibitions shall not apply to arms, related material, training or assistance authorized by the Government of Lebanon or by UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11;

16. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2007, and *expresses its intention* to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate and other steps to contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and subsequently on a regular basis;

18. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003;

19. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations Security Council

Summary of the Winograd Commission Interim Report

Major Sharon Tosi Moore

The Winograd Commission was appointed by the Israeli government in September 2006 in order to investigate and determine lessons learned from the Second Lebanon War. Justice Eliyahu Winograd, a former Israeli Supreme Court judge, chaired the commission, which also included Ruth Gavison, a law professor, Yehezkel Dror, a political science professor and two retired Major Generals, Menachem Einan and Chaim Nadel.

Although the Commission's final report is not due until 2008, it presented a classified interim report to the government and released a summary of the main findings to the public on 30 April 2007. This report focuses on the time period from the Israeli pullout from Lebanon in May 2000 to the abduction of two Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006, and then the time from 12 July to 17 July when the government decided to move to war.

The first half of the 21-point summary is essentially an explanation of the purpose, scope and goals of the Commission. It is not until point 10 that the report outlines the failures in the decisions and decision-making process. According to the report, the main failures are:

a. The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike was not based on a detailed, comprehensive, and authorized military plan, based on carefull study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena. A meticulous examination of these characteristics would have revealed the following: the ability to achieve military gains having significant political-international weight was limited; an Israeli military strike would inevitably lead to missiles fired at the Israeli civilian north; there was not other effective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the missiles were fired - which would have a high "cost" and which did not enjoy broad support. These difficulties were not explicitly raised with the political leaders before the decision to strike was taken.

b. Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing the policy of "containment," or combining political and diplomatic moves with military strikes below the "escalation level," or military preparations without immediate military action - so as to maintain for Israel the full range of responses to the abduction. This failure reflects weakness in strategic thinking, which derives the response to the event from a more comprehensive and encompassing picture.

c. The support in the cabinet for this move was gained in part through ambiguity in the presentation of goals and modes of operation, so that ministers with different or even contradictory attitudes could support it. The ministers voted for a vague decision, without understanding and knowing its nature and implications. They authorized to commence a military campaign without considering how to exit it.

d. Some of the declared goals of the war were not clear and could not be achieved, and in part were not achievable by the authorized modes of military action.

e. The IDF [Israeli Defense Force] did not exhibit creativity in proposing alternative action possibilities, did not alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between its own scenarios

and the authorized modes of action, and did not demand - as was necessary under its own plans - early mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a ground operation would be required.

f. Even after these facts became known to the political leaders, they failed to adapt the military way of operation and its goals to the reality on the ground. On the contrary, declared goals were too ambitious, and it was publicly stated that fighting will continue till they are achieved. But the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement.

The report lays these failures at the feet of the Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, the Defense Minister, Amir Peretz, and the Israeli Defense Force Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Dan Halutz.

The Prime Minister (PM) and Minister of Defense (MOD) are chastised for hasty decision-making, a non-existent military plan and a lack of understanding of the "complex features of the Lebanon front and of the military, political, and diplomatic options available to Israel." The Commission asserts that from the beginning of the conflict, the Prime Minister did not set out clear goals for the campaign, nor did he adapt his plans when the initial campaign failed. In addition, the Minister of Defense, as the minister overseeing the IDF, had little knowledge or experience, particularly in the basic principles of using military force. He also failed to examine the operational plans and IDF readiness to ensure that the plan was feasible. Overall, these two had a "serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility, and prudence."

The Chief of Staff (COS), the supreme commander of the IDF, did not alert the government of the serious issues concerning the preparedness and fitness of the armed forces for an extended ground operation. Although he was aware of the PM and MOD's lack of military knowledge and experience, the COS failed to present a clear military assessment and analysis of the operation. He, along with the members of his general staff, deliberately allowed the PM and MOD to believe that the IDF was battle-ready and had appropriate operational plans, which "exhibited flaws in professionalism, responsibility, and judgment."

However, ultimately the failure was the result of the failed policy over several administrations. Because Israel had not fought a ground war in 25 years, the IDF was not ready for this war because many of the political and military leaders believed that Israel was "beyond the era of wars." As the Commission explains:

— The shortcomings in the preparedness and the training of the army, its operational doctrine, and various flaws in its organizational culture and structure, were all the responsibility of the military commanders and political leaders in charge years before the present Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff took office.

— On the political-security strategic level, the lack of preparedness was also caused by the failure to update and fully articulate Israel's security strategy doctrine, in the fullest sense of that term, so that it could not serve as a basis for coping comprehensively will all the challenges facing Israel.

— Responsibility for this lack of an updated national security strategy lies with Israel's governments over the years. This omission made it difficult to devise an immediate proper response to the abduction, because it led to stressing an immediate and sharp military strike. If the response had been derived from a more comprehensive security strategy, it would have been easier to take into account Israel's overall balance of strengths and vulnerabilities, including the preparedness of the civil population.

— Another factor which largely contributed to the failures is the weakness of the high staff work available to the political leadership. This weakness existed under all previous Prime Ministers and this continuing failure is the responsibility of these PMs and their cabinets. The current political leadership did not act in a way that could compensate for this lack, and did not rely sufficiently on other bodies within and outside the security system that could have helped it.

— Israel's government in its plenum failed in its political function of taking full responsibility for its decisions. It did not explore and seek adequate response for various reservations that were raised, and authorized an immediate military strike that was not thought through and suffered from over-reliance on the judgment of the primary decision-makers.

The Commission identifies three immediate recommendations that need urgent attention (with the promise of many more in the final report):

1. The improvement of the quality of discussions and decision making within the government through strengthening and deepening staff work; strict enforcement of the prohibition of leaks; improving the knowledge base of all members of the government on core issues of Israel's challenges, and orderly procedures for presentation of issues for discussion and resolution.
2. Full incorporation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in security decisions with political and diplomatic aspects.
3. Substantial improvement in the functioning of the National Security Council, the establishment of a national assessment team, and creating a center for crises management in the Prime Minister's Office.

The report finishes by concluding that the government must look beyond the mistakes made in the war and focus on the need to "update in a systematic and sophisticated way Israel's overall security strategy and to consider how to mobilize and combine all its resources and sources of strength – political, economic, social, military, spiritual, cultural, and scientific – to address the totality of the challenges it faces."

Editor's Note: This paper was extracted from a longer report written for the Joint Center for Operational Analysis by Major Moore and others at the Institute for Defense Analyses. This particular paper is Annex 7 to that document.

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Lt Gen Dan Halutz, IDF Chief of Staff

Ehud Olmert, Israeli Prime Minister

Amir Peretz, Israeli Defense Minister

Final Winograd Report: English Summary

Good evening.

1. About an hour ago we submitted the Final Report of the Commission to Investigate the Lebanon Campaign in 2006 to the Prime minister, Mr. Ehud Olmert, and to the Minister of Defense, Mr. Ehud Barak.

2. The task given to us was difficult and complex. It involved the examination of events in 34 days of fighting, and the scrutiny of events before the war, since the IDF [Israeli Defense Force] had left Lebanon in 2000. This covered extensive, charged, and complex facts, unprecedented in any previous Commission of Inquiry.

3. The fact that the Government of Israel opted for such an examination, and that the army conducted a large number of inquires of a variety of military events, are a sign of strength, and an indication that the political and military leaders of Israel are willing to expose themselves to critical review and to painful but required mending.

4. We have included in the classified version of the Report all the relevant facts we have found concerning the 2nd Lebanon war, systematically and in a chronological order. This presentation of the factual basis was an important part of our work. It is reasonable to assume that no single decision maker had access to a similar factual basis. In this task we had a unique advantage over others who have written about this war, since we had access to a lot of primary and comprehensive material, and the opportunity to clarify the facts by questioning many witnesses, commanders, and soldiers, including bereaved families.

5. For obvious reasons, the unclassified Report does not include the many facts that cannot be revealed for reasons of protecting the state's security and foreign affairs. We tried, nonetheless, to balance between the wish to present the public with a meaningful picture of the events and the needs of security. We should note that we did not take the mere fact that some data has already been published in the media as a reason for including it in our unclassified Report.

6. We, the members of the Commission, acted according to the main objectives for which the Commission was established – to respond to the bad feelings of the Israeli public of a crisis and disappointment caused by the results of the 2nd Lebanon war, and from the way it was managed by the political and military echelons; and the wish to draw lessons from the failings of the war and its flaws, and to repair what is required, quickly and resolutely. We regarded as most important to investigate deeply what had happened, as a key to drawing lessons for the future, and their implementation.

7. This conception of our role was one of the main reasons for our decision not to include in the Final Report personal conclusions and recommendations. We believe that the primary need for improvements applies to the structural and systemic malfunctioning revealed in the war – on all levels.

Nonetheless, it should be stressed that the fact we refrained from imposing personal responsibility does not imply that no such responsibility exists. We also wish to repeat our statement from the Interim Report: We will not impose different standards of responsibility to the political and the military echelons, or to persons of different ranks within them.

8. Let us emphasize: when we imposed responsibility on a system, an echelon or a unit, we did not imply that the responsibility was only or mainly of those who headed it at the time of the war. Often, such responsibility stemmed from a variety of factors outside the control of those at the head. In addition, a significant part of the responsibility for the failures and flaws we have found lies with those who had been in charge of preparedness and readiness in the years before the war.

9. The purpose of this press release is not to sum up the Final Report. Rather, it is to present its highlights. The Report itself includes discussions of many important issues, which are an inseparable part of the Report, its conclusions, and recommendations.

10. In the Final Report we dealt mainly with the events of the period after the initial decision to go to war, which we had discussed in the Interim Report. Yet the events of the period covered by the Final Report took place under the shadow of the constraints created by the decision to go to war, with all its failings and flaws.

We want to stress that we stand behind everything we said in the Interim Report, and the two parts of the Report complement each other.

11. Overall, we regard the 2nd Lebanon war as a serious missed opportunity. Israel initiated a long war, which ended without its clear military victory. A semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technology advantages. The barrage of rockets aimed at Israel's civilian population lasted throughout the war, and the IDF did not provide an effective response to it. The fabric of life under fire was seriously disrupted, and many civilians either left their home temporarily or spent their time in shelters. After a long period of using only standoff fire power and limited ground activities, Israel initiated a large scale ground offensive, very close to the Security Council resolution imposing a cease fire. This offensive did not result in military gains and was not completed. These facts had far-reaching implications for us, as well as for our enemies, our neighbors, and our friends in the region and around the world.

12. In the period we examined in the Final Report – from July 18, 2006, to August 14, 2006 – again troubling findings were revealed, some of which had already been mentioned in the Interim Report:

- We found serious failings and shortcomings in the decision-making processes and staff-work in the political and the military echelons and their interface.

- We found serious failings and flaws in the quality of preparedness, decision-making and performance in the IDF high command, especially in the Army.

- We found serious failings and flaws in the lack of strategic thinking and planning, in both the political and the military echelons.

- We found severe failings and flaws in the defence of the civilian population and in coping with its being attacked by rockets.

- These weaknesses resulted in part from inadequacies of preparedness and strategic and operative planning which go back long before the 2nd Lebanon war.

13. The decision made in the night of July 12th – to react (to the kidnapping) with immediate and substantive military action, and to set for it ambitious goals - limited Israel's range of options. In fact, after the initial decision had been made, Israel had only two main options, each with its coherent internal logic, and its set of costs and disadvantages. The first was a short, painful, strong, and unexpected blow on Hezbollah, primarily through standoff fire-power. The second option was to bring about a significant change of the reality in the South of Lebanon with a large ground operation, including a temporary occupation of the South of Lebanon and 'cleaning' it of Hezbollah military infrastructure.

14. The choice between these options was within the exclusive political discretion of the government; however, the way the original decision to go to war had been made; the fact Israel went to war before it decided which option to select, and without an exit strategy – all these constituted serious failures, which affected the whole war. Responsibility for these failures lay, as we had stressed in the Interim Report, on both the political and the military echelons.

15. After the initial decision to use military force, and to the very end of the war, this period of 'equivocation' continued, with both the political and the military echelon not deciding between the two options: amplifying the military achievement by a broad military ground offensive, or abstaining from such a move and seeking to end the war quickly. This 'equivocation' did hurt Israel. Despite awareness of this fact, long weeks passed without a serious discussion of these options, and without a decision – one way or the other – between them.

16. In addition to avoiding a decision about the trajectory of the military action, there was a very long delay in the deployment necessary for an extensive ground offensive, which was another factor limiting Israel's freedom of action and political flexibility: Till the first week of August, Israel did not prepare the military capacity to start a massive ground operation.
17. As a result, Israel did not stop after its early military achievements, and was 'dragged' into a ground operation only after the political and diplomatic timetable prevented its effective completion. The responsibility for this basic failure in conducting the

war lies at the doorstep of both the political and the military echelons.

18. The overall image of the war was a result of a mixture of flawed conduct of the political and the military echelons and the interface between them, of flawed performance by the IDF, and especially the ground forces, and of deficient Israeli preparedness. Israel did not use its military force well and effectively, despite the fact that it was a limited war initiated by Israel itself. At the end of the day, Israel did not gain a political achievement because of military successes; rather, it relied on a political agreement, which included positive elements for Israel, which permitted it to stop a war which it had failed to win.

19. This outcome was primarily caused by the fact that, from the very beginning, the war has not been conducted on the basis of deep understanding of the theatre of operations, of the IDF's readiness and preparedness, and of basic principles of using military power to achieve a political and diplomatic goal.

20. All in all, the IDF failed, especially because of the conduct of the high command and the ground forces, to provide an effective military response to the challenge posed to it by the war in Lebanon, and thus failed to provide the political echelon with a military achievement that could have served as the basis for political and diplomatic action. Responsibility for this outcomes lies mainly with the IDF, but the misfit between the mode of action and the goals determined by the political echelon share responsibility.

21. We should note that, alongside the failures in the IDF performance, there were also important military achievements. Special mention should go to the great willingness of the soldiers, especially reserve soldiers, to serve and fight in the war, as well as the many instances of heroism, courage, self-sacrifice, and devotion of many commanders and soldiers.

22. The air force should be congratulated on very impressive achievements in this war. However, there were those in the IDF high command, joined by some in the political echelon, who entertained a baseless hope that the capabilities of the air force could prove decisive in the war. In fact, the impressive achievements of the air force were necessarily limited, and were eroded by the weaknesses in the overall performance of the IDF.

23. The "Hannit" episode colored to a large extent the whole performance of the Navy, despite the fact that it made a critical contribution to the naval blockade, and provided the Northern Command with varied effective support of its fighting.

24. We should also note that the war had significant diplomatic achievements. SC resolution 1701 [United Nations Security Council Resolution], and the fact it was adopted unanimously, were an achievement for Israel. This conclusion stands even if it turns out that only a part of the stipulations of the resolution were implemented or will be implemented, and even if it could have been foreseen that some of them would not be implemented. This conclusion also does not depend on the intentions or goals of the powers that supported the resolution.

25. We note, however, that we have seen no serious staff work on Israeli positions in the negotiations. This situation improved in part when the team headed by the prime minister's head of staff was established. The team worked efficiently and with dedication, professionalism and coordination. This could not compensate, however, for the absence of preparatory staff work and discussions in the senior political echelon.

26. This fact may have much significance to the way Israel conducts negotiations, and to the actual content of the arrangements reached. In such negotiations, decisions are often made that may have far-reaching implications on Israel's interests, including the setting of precedents.

27. The staff work done in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the adoption of a favorable resolution in the Security Council was, in the main, quick, systematic, and efficient. At the same time, for a variety of reasons, it did not reflect clear awareness of the essential need to maintain an effective relationship between military achievements and diplomatic activities.

28. We now turn to the political and military activity concerning the ground operation at the end of the war. This is one of the central foci of public debate.

29. True, in hindsight, the large ground operation did not achieve its goals of limiting the rocket fire and changing the picture of the war. It is not clear what the ground operation contributed to speeding up the diplomatic achievement or improving it. It is also

unclear to what extent starting the ground offensive affected the reactions of the government of Lebanon and Hezbollah to the ceasefire.

30. Nonetheless, it is important to stress that the evaluation of these decisions should not be made with hindsight. It cannot depend on the achievements or the costs these decisions in fact had. The evaluation must be based only on the reasons for the operation, and its risks and prospects as they were known – or as they should have been known – when it was decided upon. Moreover, it is impossible to evaluate the ground operation at the end of the war without recalling the developments that preceded it and the repeated delays in the adoption of the Security Council resolution; and as a part of the overall conduct of the war.

31. Against this background, we make the following findings on the main decisions:

- The cabinet decision of August 9th – to approve in principle the IDF plan, but to authorize the PM [Prime Minister] and the MOD [Minister of Defense] to decide if and when it should be activated, according to the diplomatic timetable – was almost inevitable, giving the Israeli government necessary military and political flexibility.

- The decision to start in fact the ground operation was within the political and professional discretion of its makers, on the basis of the facts before them. The goals of the ground operation were legitimate, and were not exhausted by the wish to hasten or improve the diplomatic achievement. There was no failure in that decision in itself, despite its limited achievements and its painful costs.

- Both the position of the Prime minister – who had preferred to avoid the ground operation – and the position of the Minister of Defense – who had thought it would have served Israel's interest to go for it – had been taken on the merits and on the basis of evidence. Both enjoyed serious support among the members of the general staff of the IDF and others. Even if both statesmen took into account political and public concerns – a fact we cannot ascertain – we believe that they both acted out of a strong and sincere perception of what they thought at the time was Israel's interest.

32. We want to stress: The duty to make these difficult decisions was the political leaders'. The sole test of these decisions is public and political.

33. At the same time, we also note that:

- We have not found within either the political or the military echelons a serious consideration of the question whether it was reasonable to expect military achievements in 60 hours that could have contributed meaningfully to any of the goals of the operation;

- We have not found that the political echelon was aware of the details of the fighting in real time, and we have not seen a discussion, in either the political or the military echelons, of the issue of stopping the military operation after the Security Council resolution was adopted;

- We have not seen an explanation of the tension between the great effort to get additional time to conclude the first stage of the planned ground operation and the decisions not to go on fighting until the ceasefire itself.

34. A description of failures in the conduct of war may be regarded as harming Israel. There will be those who may use our findings to hurt Israel and its army. We nonetheless point out these failures and shortcomings because we are certain that only in this way Israel may come out of this ordeal strengthened. We are pleased that processes of repair have already started. We recommend a deep and systematic continuation of such processes. It is exclusively in the hands of Israeli leaders and public to determine whether, when facing challenges in the future, we will come to them more prepared and ready, and whether we shall cope with them in a more serious and responsible way than the way the decision-makers had acted – in the political and the military echelons – in the 2nd Lebanon war.

35. Our recommendations contain suggestions for systemic and deep changes in the modalities of thinking and acting of the political and military echelons and their interface, in both routine and emergency, including war. These are deep and critical processes. Their significance should not be obscured by current affairs, local successes, or initial repairs. A persistent and prolonged effort, on many levels, will be needed in order to bring about the essential improvements in

the ways of thinking and acting of the political-military systems.

36. For these reasons we would like to caution against dangers which might upset plans and delay required change processes, and thus produce dangerous results:

- Fear of criticism in case of failure may lead to defensive reactions, working by the book, and abstention from making resolute decisions and preferring non-action. Such behavior is undesirable and also dangerous.

- In a dynamic complex reality, one should not prepare better for the last war. It is also essential not to limit oneself to superficial action, designed to create an appearance that flaws had been corrected.

- It is also essential not to focus exclusively on coping with dangers, but to combine readiness for threat scenarios with an active seeking of opportunities.

- When speaking on learning, one should take into account that enemies, too, are learning their lessons.

37. The 2nd Lebanon War has brought again to the foreground for thought and discussion issues that some parts of Israeli society had preferred to suppress: Israel cannot survive in this region, and cannot live in it in peace or at least non-war, unless people in Israel itself and in its surroundings believe that Israel has the political and military leadership, military capabilities, and social robustness that will allow her to deter those of its neighbors who wish to harm her, and to prevent them – if necessary through the use of military force – from achieving their goal.

38. These truths do not depend on one's partisan or political views. Israel must – politically and morally – seek peace with its neighbors and make necessary compromises. At the same time, seeking peace or managing the conflict must come from a position of social, political, and military strength, and through the ability and willingness to fight for the state, its values and the security of its population even in the absence of peace.

39. These truths have profound and far-reaching implications for many dimensions of life in Israel and the ways its challenges are managed. Beyond examining the way the Lebanon War was planned and conducted; beyond the examination of flaws in decision-making and performance that had been revealed in it – important as they may be; these are the central questions that the Lebanon war has raised. These are issues that lie at the very essence of our existence here as a Jewish and democratic state. These are the questions we need to concentrate on.

40. We hope that our findings and conclusions in the Interim and the Final Reports will bring about not only a redress of failings and flaws, but help Israeli society, its leaders and thinkers, to advance the long-term goals of Israel, and develop the appropriate ways to address the challenges and respond to them.

41. We are grateful for the trust put in us when this difficult task was given to us. If we succeed in facilitating rectification of the failings we have identified – this will be our best reward.

Reprinted from the Jerusalem Diary, 30 January 2008.

Hizballah Bunkers

Terrorist to Techno-Guerilla: The Changing Face of Asymmetric Warfare

Mr. Clyde Royston

> With the Internet to provide intelligence, and with the increasing power of available weaponry, the individual or small group is becoming ever more dangerous to the state.

In the summer of 2006 a team from JCOA deployed to study the noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) in Lebanon. As we observed the NEO, we saw something even more interesting develop. We saw, for the first time, an "Arab Army" fight the Israelis to a perceived draw. This draw, achieved by the non-nation state forces of Hezballah against the most powerful military in the region, translated into a win in the majority of the Arab world's eyes. The successes of Hezballah led us to re-assess how we in Department of Defense (DOD) view terrorist organizations and their emerging capabilities.

The World is Changing

We are seeing unconventional actors appear on the world stage with new, state-like military clout, and nation states arranging "deep coalitions" with non-state actors in unique ways. Asymmetric approaches are being employed by state and non-state actors alike.

In describing this signifcant change, General Krulak, former Commandant of the US Marine Corps, stated, "The rapid diffusion of technology, the growth of a multitude of transnational factors, and the consequences of increasing globalization and economic interdependence, have coalesced to create national security challenges remarkable for their complexity." [1]

It is these challenges, as exemplified by Hezballah in the summer of 2006, which we attempt to understand through the framework of the "techno-guerilla."

The Enemy is Changing

Although asymmetric warfare discussions often characterize recent developments as something "new," they are more correctly characterized as part of the *evolution* of asymmetric warfare. From ancient times to the 21st century, man's conflicts have often pitted a stronger opponent against a weaker one. The weaker combatant seeks advantage through the asymmetric path.

Asymmetry is an idea as old as warfare itself. Examples of asymmetry include David and Goliath (the use of innovative weapons), the Trojan Horse (the use of surprise), Sun Tzu (the use of Judo as warfare), kamikaze pilots in WWII, the mujahideen in Afghanistan, and the use of Boeing 757s as missiles in 2001.

Among strategic theorists, Sun Tzu placed great stock in psychological and informational asymmetry, writing that:

> "All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him." [2]

What is in fact new in asymmetric warfare is the pace of change and the proliferation of capability, where a few can affect many (such as with weapons of mass

destruction (WMD)). In effect, the Hezballah campaign in Lebanon has revealed that the relative danger of the threat is changing. It is now possible that such organizations can be true national security threats.

Evolution of Capabilities

This slide **UNCLASSIFIED**

Common Elements	Nation-State	PLO	Hizballah
Advanced C2	X		X (Simple, effective, modern)
Direct Fire	X	X (Small arms, explosives)	X (Combined Arms)
Maneuver	X	X (Hit & run)	X (Swarming)
Modern ISR	X		X (Integrated sensors)
Indirect Fire	X		X (Human shields)
Precision Weapons	X		X (Strong Enabler)
Mass Media as IO	X		X (Includes HADR)
Morally Unconstrained			X (Religious extremism)
'State within a State'			X (Hollow State)
Sophisticated Relationships	X		X (Shared means, strange bedfellows)

* Lebanese Hizballah: An example of the emerging Techno-Guerilla

An asymmetric force with state-like impact

As the figure above shows, there is an evolving paradigm in the world today. Open source warfare, or "wiki warfare," refers to the ability of a terrorist organization to decentralize its operations using collaboration and coordination with others via the Internet. This capability not only expands the number of potential participants, it shrinks the group size below normal measures of viability (and detectability). This organizational structure creates a dynamic whereby new entrants can appear anywhere, at any time; in London, Madrid, Berlin, or New York. The *levee en masse* or "cyber-mobilization" effect is described below:

> "The longevity and resilience of Al Qaeda are not predicated on the total quantity of terrorists that it may have trained in the past but more simply on its capacity to continue to recruit, mobilize and inspire both actual and potential fighters, supporters, and sympathizers." [3]

A second feature of the evolving asymmetry is the capability to conduct systems disruption, or sabotage that goes beyond the simple destruction of physical infrastructure. Complex, global systems are being targeted through increasingly sophisticated enemy analysis, with data and information often provided through open source channels. This in turn facilitates the next part of the changing paradigm, the creation of virtual nations.

No longer are guerrilla movements or terrorists aimed at taking control of the reins of a single state, or acting merely as proxies for states. Transnational insurgencies, often based upon primary loyalties (religious and/or tribal identities), gain momentum through the weakening and disruption of states---allowing for the creation of states within states, further weakening the legitimate nation state.

In the chart above we have attempted to identify some of the elements of warfare common to a nation state, a terrorist group (exemplified by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) of the 1970s), and the rapidly emerging "techno-guerilla" force (exemplified by Hezballah). There are key elements of modern warfare that have traditionally been used by nation states to their great advantage. As the world and the enemy have changed over recent years, these attributes have been increasingly incorporated by the emergent techno-guerilla (i.e., Hezballah). For example:

- **Advanced Command and Control (C2)**, traditionally the strong suit of nation states, has been used successfully by the techno-guerilla. Their C2 systems include simple yet effective networks with protected communications links, and computers slaved to modern intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors. As an example, Hezballah leveraged this ability in the summer of 2006 to support their "swarm tactics," emerging from underground hiding places in villages and towns upon signal, causing Israeli forces to "retake" the same ground several times. Advanced C2 allowed multiple smaller units to act

independently, yet in concert with each other. Their swarming activities achieved a greater effect and then allowed quick dispersal and "disappearance."

- **Modern ISR.** Hezballah used advanced technology to prosecute its war against Israel in the summer of 2006. As an example, remote-controlled, state-of-the-art British Thermo-vision 1000 LR tactical night-vision systems provided Hezballah forces in southern command posts the ability to detect and report movements of Israeli forces.

- **An indirect fire** capability resulted from the Hezballah emplacement of Katyusha missiles in civilian apartment buildings, making avoidance of civilian casualties extraordinarily difficult. This fed mass media effects, and placed the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in a "catch-22" situation where they were damned if they struck these missile emplacements and damned if they didn't.

- **Precision weapons** capable of defeating modern Israeli armor, including the Koronet and Metis-M anti-tank guided missiles, and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles, were often used by Hezballah in unique ways, including attacks against dismounted infantry taking cover in buildings.

- **Mass media** was used as a weapon of mass effect. Hezballah was able to leverage Arab and Islamic perceptions to generate a world view that survival equaled non-defeat, non-defeat equaled victory, and victory equaled destruction of the perception of IDF invulnerability. Included in this category were the substantial and ongoing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) construction efforts of Hezballah during and immediately following the war. As the New York Times reported:

> BEIRUT, Lebanon, August 15 [2006] — As stunned Lebanese returned Tuesday over broken roads to shattered apartments in the south, it increasingly seemed that the beneficiary of the destruction was most likely to be Hezballah. A major reason — in addition to its hard-won reputation as the only Arab force that fought Israel to a standstill — is that it is already dominating the efforts to rebuild with a torrent of money from oil-rich Iran.[4]

As reported in the media of the world, these reconstruction efforts generated goodwill and a sense of legitimacy for Hezballah. Militias such as Hezballah, that rise to the level of becoming "a state within a state," provide essential services and become, in effect, shadow governments undermining the legitimacy of the affected nation state.

- **Weapons of mass effect**, including missiles such as extended range Katyushas and the Zelzel 1-3, Boeing 757s, and other weapons, were used in creative ways to threaten civilians and "bring the war home" to the infidel.

- **Deep coalitions**, where nation states team up with techno-guerillas to wage war by proxy, create enormous geo-political and military challenges. Hezballah, with its Iranian and Syrian support, waged a war by proxy against Israel in the summer of 2006, a war described by guerrilla warfare expert, Charles Robb, as "the first epochal war of the 21st Century."[5]

Exploiting Techno-Guerilla Weaknesses

The conventional state force can counter the Techno-Guerilla by pitting its strengths against the Techno-Guerilla's weaknesses.

- The conventional force can use its vertical C2 superiority to deliver a high volume of high explosive and precision munitions (AC130, fixed wing, rotary wing, thermobarics).
- Conventional forces can isolate the Techno-Guerilla with naval blockades of ports and strategic chokepoints.
- Conventional forces can flood Techno-Guerilla battlefields in greater numbers.
- Conventional forces can exploit superior intelligence capabilities to find and track the guerilla and provide the sustainment required to maintain pursuit.
- Conventional forces can create dilemmas for the guerilla through the dynamic employment of large scale operational / strategic maneuver (air assault and airborne)
- Conventional forces should be able to maintain technical superiority through accelerated and pervasive fielding of new technologies.

What Next?

The techno-guerilla is not invincible, and can be countered by capitalizing upon traditional nation state strengths. These strengths include diplomacy and other instruments of national power, sheer numbers of military forces, greater technological advances, a hierarchical command structure that can rapidly deliver munitions upon targets, and far more sophisticated air and naval force capabilities.

However, defeating a techno-guerilla force also requires various types of intelligence, detailed knowledge of the enemy, and creative and innovative solutions. It is essential that we learn the lessons of Hezballah's successes against the IDF, and incorporate these lessons into our way of thinking. Changes in the global threat model give the techno-guerilla the ability to obtain a WMD capability in the near future—DOD's transformation must meet the emerging threat with a fundamental conceptual change in our thought processes, prioritization, and resourcing.

Endnotes:

[1] General Charles C. Krulak, "Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines*, January 1999

[2] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, 1963

[3] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Cyber-Mobilization: The New Levée en Masse," *Parameters*, Summer 2006

[4] New York Times, August 16, 2006

[5] John Robb, Global Guerrillas, http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com

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Mr. Clyde Royston graduated from the University of California Santa Barbara with a Bachelors Degree in 1984, and in 1987 he received his Doctorate from the University of San Diego. He received a direct commission to Naval Intelligence in 1988. Currently employed by Lockheed Martin, Mr. Royston has over 20 years experience in operational and strategic intelligence, including counterterrorism and intelligence support to Special Operations. He currently serves as the Senior Intelligence Advisor to the USJFCOM Joint Center for Operational Analysis. He is an internationally recognized advisor in counterterrorism and asymmetric warfare, serving on numerous deployments in Iraq and the Middle-East.

Muhammad Atta, the mastermind of the 11 September 2001 attack using Boeing 757 aircraft on the World Trade Center in New York City.

"Thousands of encrypted messages that had been posted in a password-protected area of a website were found by federal officials on the computer [of the man] who reportedly masterminded the September 11 attacks.

Instructions . . . are often disguised by means of steganography, which involves hiding messages inside graphic files."

Gary Weiman

Special Report, US Institute of Peace

INSURGENCY AND THE ROLE OF THE 21ST CENTURY SPECIAL OPERATOR: AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY GUIDE

ROD PROPST, PRINCIPAL TERRORISM ANALYST, ANSER CORPORATION

As the 21st Century unfolds, the fog of containment, a strategy which defined both our political and military worlds for the second half of the 20th century, has dissipated. In its place is a world of greater uncertainty—militarily, politically, diplomatically, economically—with no single strategy other than [perhaps] "Preemption" having established a strategic foothold. For the special operator—our cutting edge political-military (pol-mil) warrior—what has emerged in these early years of the 21st Century is a focus on insurgency. Much has been made of "lost lessons-learned"; in fact, the wheel was partially reinvented, but in fairness updated with a new century focus, with the publication of the Army's Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, in December 2006. This article seeks to place what we know, from this century's experience; what we knew before, using some superior examples of insurgency literature every special operator should know; and how the operator can apply that knowledge in the many roles every military professional faces in one's career.

Preparation of the special operator is a lifetime's undertaking. T.E. Lawrence, one of history's great insurgent warriors, once asked Basil Liddell Hart, "If your new book could persuade some of our new soldiers to read and mark and learn things outside drill manuals and tactical diagrams, it would be a good work." Lawrence described himself as an example of the necessary—"I was not an instinctive soldier… When I took a decision, or adopted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant—and many irrelevant—factors. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards—all were at my fingertips. The enemy I knew almost like my own side. I risked myself *among them* [author's emphasis) a hundred times to learn." This is the special operator corps at its heart; and the present article seeks to assist the reader in taking one small step forward in this endless endeavor—an understanding of insurgency for the 21st Century special operator.

The 21st Century Face of Insurgency—Counterinsurgency and FM 3-24

Navigating the maze of insurgency analyses is as fraught with philosophical danger as that faced by our warriors facing the physical threat of improvised explosive devices and explosively formed projectiles used by rebels in our current conflict with Iraqi insurgents. Instead of an exploration of the myriad books available currently on insurgencies, the author believes it is most worthwhile to discuss insurgency in terms of current doctrine—as stated in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. The reason for this tack is simple—it is our doctrine, it represents our military's current best thought on what insurgency and countering that threat should look like, and it ensures that the reader gets at least a summary view of our doctrinal framework.

The initial chapter offers the requisite overview for the reader unfamiliar with this non-traditional form of warfare for regular Army officer study. In the second chapter, the linkage between politics, diplomacy, host nation actors, and the martial aspect are all creatively linked—a linkage which the descriptions of the books which follow establishes as essential to counterinsurgency operations.

Chapter 3 deals in some detail on intelligence in counterinsurgency operations. The element of information is absolutely critical to the conduct and success of counterinsurgency operations. In particular, both Mao Zedong and Frank Kitson repeatedly hammer the reader on the importance of good information to counter the efforts of the insurgent adversary.

Chapters 4 and 5 are planning chapters. The former offers an overhead view of campaign and large operations planning. The latter delves more specifically into the execution of such a plan. Key in the fifth chapter is the short section on learning and adapting; the mere brevity of that short entry should not be a signal to the reader to offer that subject short shrift. The loss of lessons learned is precisely what prompted the re-engineering of the present manual—as we seemed to

have momentarily misplaced the many lessons learned that both our prior experience and the body of work discussed herein provides.

Chapter 6 is particularly relevant to the modern, 21st Century reader. One of our greatest challenges is an exit strategy for separation from an insurgency, thus allowing a host nation force to assume our role. In order to reach that goal, the development of solid host nation security forces is essential. This chapter describes that challenge and how to meet it. Although not specifically designed as a companion chapter, Chapter 7 offers a logical extension of the previous chapter. Discussing leadership and ethics is more than critical—it is absolutely essential to counterinsurgency success. If the insurgent lives like the fish in the sea of the people (Mao), then our task is to make that sea one in which we swim equally with the insurgent. The enabler to do so is based on ethical, fair treatment of the population, who otherwise are driven to the enemy—as case study after case study not only suggests but precisely describes.

Chapter 8 deals with the logistical considerations for counterinsurgency. As most staff college graduates attest, the study of logistics was not their favorite element in the college; however, all realize its importance. The value-added of understanding how to sustain a counterinsurgency is equally important to the special operator reader on insurgencies.

The doctrinal volume ends with several appendices of significance—all worth review then careful study and application as warfighter and as special operator political-insurgent-counterinsurgent advisor. An understanding of the legal considerations of counterinsurgency is essential for the conduct of the ethical fight we demand of ourselves as professionals (Appendix D). The requirement for linguistic support of course rings true to every special operator; understanding the importance of that capability and how to make it so is the subject of Appendix C. Appendix B offers an analytic approach for the application of METT-TC [mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available and civil considerations]. Although it seems at first too difficult and burdensome, it is remarkably straight-forward and easy to apply. A careful study of this simple analytic tool is a must for the special operator student of insurgency.

The last Appendix discussed is intentionally out of order. Perhaps the most practical of the several Appendices is Appendix A. It is similar to the famous "150 Questions for a Guerrilla," the classic book by General Alberto Bayo, Castro's long-time mentor. The "Guide for Action" offers a hands-on, practical guide for the individual about to enter a counterinsurgency. Its sixty step-by-step guidelines walk even the greenest participant through a process leading to greatest individual effectiveness in a counterinsurgency role. Its straight forward "plan, prepare, execute" format is accessible and easy to use.

The last section of FM 3-24 of immediate use by the reader is the list of references. One will note that highlights of several of these references are summarized in this paper. This is a solid initial study list for the counterinsurgent warrior of the 21st Century.

A one page overview of our military's newest counterinsurgency doctrine barely suffices; a more thorough review for understanding—coupled with extensive research and reading on the subject—will be requisite for the serious special operator student of this subject.

Author's NOTE: The thorough reader, in conjunction with a careful study of the current doctrine, may wish to consider reading the several versions of FM 31-20 (1951, '55, '65, '71, '90, and present) and FM 31-21 (1951, '58, '61, '69, and present) to measure the development of doctrinal understanding and development of insurgency, guerrilla, and revolutionary warfare that these two central doctrinal volumes capture. Also note the Army's definition of "guerrilla" parallels the current definition for "insurgent."

This snapshot sought to provide a simplistic [space-constrained] overview of this important new manual. Equally of value is a study of some of the classics from the wealth of insurgency and counterinsurgency literature. That is the subject of the next portion of this brief overview study.

Insurgency—Learning from the Past: Nine Essential Special Operator Reads

For the modern special operator, study is continuous. Yet, the careful professional must always proceed with

caution. Global and sometimes even regional expertise is essential—it is at the heart of the special operator's value-added to the military. However, regional expertise must be combined with a broader perspective on the warfighting art. The challenge is formidable; the rewards great. The challenge for the operator is not to become a Pacific Ocean wading pool—very broad, but too shallow to be worth much; given the reality of time constraints, vaulting that obstacle represents a continuing test. From the wealth of insurgency and counterinsurgency literature, the author has chosen to pick some essential highlights from nine indispensable, classic studies. This article can barely do justice to these complex works; but perhaps by at least identifying these to the reader, guided study—providing the greater depth of knowledge we seek—will result. From theoretical works—Robert Taber's *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare*; Bard E. O'Neill's *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*; Mao Zedong's *On Guerrilla Warfare*—to case studies such as Alistair Horne's *A Savage War of Peace* (Algeria); T.E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (Arabia); Robert Asprey's *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*; the Special Operations Research Office's *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Accounts*—to "how-to" books such as Frank Kitson's *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping*; and the United States Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual*—we shall identify essential, common threads.

War of the Flea

Robert Taber's *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare* remains—despite its publication date in 1965—relevant and largely current. While its concluding chapters concerning a roadmap for the conflict in Vietnam are of less interest today than when written, its introductory description of the nuts and bolts of insurgency offers the student new to the subject plenty of initial meat on which to chew. Prior to the introduction of that foundational material, it is useful to understand the meaning of the title the author selected.

The analogy insurgent as a flea is particularly apt and sets the stage for much that follows. The flea survives because he trades time for space, and uses that to multiply and create a larger community—a community which ultimately simply wears the host down. Insurgencies seek to recreate this ambience. A small core group (as few as eighteen men, such as Castro's initial insurgents) enters a country. At first they are a minor itch; over time, they grow. The host government tries to scratch at them, but the insurgent uses the space available to engage at selected times and places; the flea is analogous to Mao's fish in the sea. Next, again over time—time developed through judicious use of space—the insurgent creates a growing political will in the people for support. The insurgent militates the population. He creates the "will to revolt." In this sense the insurgent flea is a "political partisan"—they are "…woers as well as doers." At all times the insurgent gains a foothold, often fighting a military and political enemy whose goals are so disparate as to cause failure before the war even develops.

Taber uses several case studies—albeit not in the depth that some of our other key sources describe—to further his description of insurgent warfare. Of course, Taber quotes Mao, as the fish in the sea metaphor earlier indicated. He also provides short lists from Sun Tzu, upon whom Mao based many of his martial, insurgent ideas. He then shows how select insurgencies—the Irish in the six Northern Counties, and the EOKA [National Organization of Cypriot Fighters] in Cyprus are among these excellent overviews—applied these fundamentals. And he uses these to reveal a common theme—"despite the impressive technological innovation of the 20th Century, the principles of warfare are not modern, but ancient." He reveals General Giap's methods in Vietnam, "…dynamism, initiative, mobility, and rapidity of decision in the face of new situations." He uses General Grivas—the Cypriot insurgency's leader—as a link showing how the judicious use of focused terrorism serves the insurgent well. He describes a "…plague of dragon's teeth, sown in confusion, nourished in the soil of social dissention, economic disruption, and political chaos, causing armed fanatics to spring up wherever peaceful peasants toiled."

Taber then moves on to why it remains so difficult for a larger power and its military to defeat an insurgency. He states, the "Army fights to control territory, roads, strategic heights, vital areas; the guerrilla fights to control people, without whose cooperation the land is useless to its possessor." The government and its military must control their land, its resources. In contrast, for the guerrilla, "territory is nothing, attrition is everything." The insurgent succeeds because his

goal is achievable; the opposing government often fails because it is fighting a different war, whose ends are often immaterial to the enemy it faces. Thus, the government is vulnerable, and must maintain the appearance of normalcy to succeed. Where it is unable to do so, an insurgency has a marked advantage. And where the protracted war, which is a central strength of insurgencies, continues the government is at ever-increasing risk. Taber's own words are of best use here, and tell a cautionary tale to those who must execute counterinsurgencies in the 21st Century:

- ✓ "Modern governments are highly conscious of what journalism calls 'world opinion'…larger community of interests …appearance of stability…protracted internal war threatens all of this."
- ✓ "Insurgency was successful simply because terror, sabotage, and constant disorder [make the situation] too unprofitable and politically embarrassing…to remain."
- ✓ "Rebellious colony through terrorism and guerrilla warfare, becomes (1) too great a political embarrassment to be sustained domestically or on the world stage, and (2) unprofitable, too expensive, or no longer prestigious."
- ✓ "Local military success will serve no purpose if the guerrilla campaign does not also weaken the morale of the government and its soldiers, strain the financial resources of the regime, and increase political pressure on it by creating widespread apprehension and dissatisfaction with a war in which there is no progress—and no end in sight."
- ✓ Thus, in summary, "It has given freely of its brains, its blood, and its lives. All has been to no avail. The world's mightiest nation has been unable to find the key to success."

Of course, the reader clearly sees the applicability of these cautions and challenges in our present world.

The insurgent "…flea survives by hopping and hiding; he prevails because he multiplies faster than he can be caught and exterminated." He does this by trading time for space in order to buy the ability to create a climate of change in the people. This—along with the two simultaneous yet disparate wars of the insurgent and the controlling government and military—form the heart of Taber's initial study of insurgency, O'Neill's book builds upon this introductory description with another theoretical work.

Insurgency and Terrorism: from Revolution to Apocalypse

A second theoretical work also proves of value to the special operator studying insurgency literature. *Insurgency and Terrorism: from Revolution to Apocalypse*, by Bard E. O'Neill, actually offers a theoretical framework for the analysis of insurgencies—by students, warfighters, and other analysts, all of which identify the modern special operator. Written in 1990, it is even more compelling as a tool for today than it was on publication. Before O'Neill begins his description of his analytic tool, he describes some of the challenges of the study of insurgencies. Among these are ones the modern reader will recognize as relevant today—challenges of national integration and economic underdevelopment, the internationalization of insurgencies, the asymmetrical nature of the conflict and renewed North American involvement (we may have missed the need to colonize, but we have been less successful dodging the "imperialist" bullet).

O'Neill's definition of insurgency is spot on. For him it is a "Struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more areas of politics." He then defines politics using three elements: the political system, the authorities, and their policies.

O'Neill further describes the types of insurgencies: anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist. He then outlines the four problem areas associated with the proper identification of insurgent type (an important consideration for anyone who would use his analytic tool to study a particular insurgency. These four problem areas are: goal transformation, goal conflicts, misleading rhetoric, and goal ambiguity.

He concludes his introduction with a brief preview of the coming discussion of politics and the forms of warfare—with an emphasis on terrorism. Before detailing the various forms of insurgent strategies, he describes six variables that lead insurgents to pick a winning stratagem. These are: environment, popular support, organization, unity, external support, and the

government response. These six factors form the basis for O'Neill's analytic tool.

Having defined the variables defining strategic approaches, O'Neil then introduces the several strategies available to insurgents. These include: the conspiratorial strategy (the quick strike—like the Bolshevik's of 1917), the protracted popular war (the Mao approach), the military-focus strategy (adopted by the South in our own Civil War), and the urban warfare strategy (the IRA [Irish Republican Army] approach—paralleling today's conflict in Iraq). The next six chapters provide details on each of the six elements of O'Neill's model.

Most interesting is the chapter on government response, since that is the area where the special operator will likely be a government value-added. Nearly every page has a sentence or phrase that jumps out at the modern reader as applicable to the 21st Century special operator:

- ✓ "The success of the operation depends not primarily on the development of the insurgent strength, but more importantly on the degree of vigor, determination, and skill with which the incumbent regime acts to defend itself, both politically and militarily";
- ✓ "Historical and contemporary data reveal instances in which governments have misdirected policies because they misunderstood or falsely portrayed the goals, techniques, strategies, and accomplishments of their opponents. Whatever the reasons (inflexibility, sloppy thinking, ignorance, biases, bureaucratic imperatives, or psychological aversion to acknowledgement one's own weaknesses), the outcome is flawed, costly, and sometimes fatal policies and behavior";
- ✓ "Experience and the experts suggest that the most effective way to deal with internal terrorism…is to emphasize police work, good intelligence, and judicial sanctions";
- ✓ "Adaptability is crucial";
- ✓ The important features of popular support—charismatic attraction of the insurgent leader, nationalism, religious appeals;
- ✓ Placing a "premium on patience";
- ✓ "Even where terrorism is limited to internal attacks, international cooperation is important because… aid for terrorists often come[s] from the outside";
- ✓ The absence of flexibility and integrity "…can create untold difficulties… [and the} absence of these attributes has a corrosive effect"; and finally,
- ✓ What is requisite is patience—the "will to stay the course."

These are hardly revelations to the reader, but surely paint a clear cautionary picture to the political-military analyst. O'Neill's analytic framework offers a clear road usable to SPECIAL OPERATOR analysts in the pursuit of their efforts.

On Guerrilla Warfare

As a long-recognized classic suitable for study by all officers, Mao Zedong's *On Guerrilla Warfare*, merits special inclusion for the special operator studying insurgency. Of the many available editions, any one that uses Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith's translation is recommended, as his introductory insights are as valuable to the reader as Mao's words.

Mao's guidance is simple, and need not be overly complicated by the reader. Mao begins with the most important linkage between the political and warfare; the reader will see this common thread throughout the selected studies. He cautions—as does Sam Griffith later—the military on too tight a focus solely on the military. "There are some militarists who say, 'We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms.' It is vital that these simple minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs." This linkage finds common expression across many of the selected works summarized in this paper.

Mao then simply states the strategy for this type of martial endeavor—"…select the tactics of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; seek a lightning decision…withdraw when [the enemy] advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary." Central to Mao's approach was the conservation of [limited] human resources. Most important in this aspect may be the concept of "protracted war"; that is as vital today as it was in

Mao's time—and important for the special operator to understand, as it clearly indicates that insurgents are in it for the long haul, and their concern for American electoral cycles approaches zero, unless those cycles can be used to gain them an advantage over the US enemy.

The crucial link between the warrior and the people forms Mao's next set of advice. The guerrilla/insurgent is of the people, for the people, and utterly dependent upon the people for his survival and success. He cautions that the people must "…be inspired to cooperate voluntarily. We must not force them." Mao captured the essence of this formula in three rules and eight remarks, and used these to ensure that this vital link was never weakened by his forces. They are as follows:

"Rules:

1. All actions are subject to command.
2. Do not steal from the people.
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks:

1. Replace the door when you leave the house.
2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
3. Be courteous.
4. Be honest in your transactions.
5. Return what you borrow.
6. Replace what you break.
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.
8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest."

Mao's simple lesson—the strong link between force and politics and the same permanent link between the warfighter and the people surrounding the insurgent make this short book a must read.

Savage War of Peace

Alistair Horne's *A Savage War of Peace* (a book length case study of the Algerian insurgency) possesses dual value. First, as an exhaustive case study of all facets of an insurgency from the balanced point of view of all participants, it represents a thorough model of the several elements of insurgency and counterinsurgency "Common Threads", which appear in this paper's conclusion. Second, the Algerian savage war resonates in the current experience of the early 21st Century, with many lessons learned, to be learned, or in some cases lessons sadly forgotten. Horne's significant lessons from his case study include: 1) commonality and cohesiveness; 2) small beginnings; 3) military primacy; and, 4) the use of torture.

Commonality and Cohesiveness. Insurgencies share participant characteristics in common. These often include ethnicity. Although even the Muslim Algerians were of significantly mixed heritage—Berber, Arab, Kabyle, Chaouia, Mauritanian, and Turk—they were perceived by the French government and the Algerian *pied noir* colonists as simply Arabs, beneath and different. Separate and different, the native Algerians began to see themselves as the true Algerians, meriting their own government for their own people. Another commonality is of locale. While marginally "mixed," the truth is that French colonists and native Algerians were ghettoized. The most notorious of these was the *Casbah* of Algiers, where more than 100 thousand Muslims existed in under a square kilometer. This eased difficulties of attack and reprisal on both sides throughout the insurgency. Yet another commonality was of language. While many *pied noir* spoke Arabic, and many Algerians spoke French, for most French, Arabic was a foreign tongue; admittedly, this linguistic isolation was often used to the insurgents' advantage. Although others may be mentioned as adjuncts, the final significant commonality was that of religion. The Islamic faith bound the insurgents' backgrounds; although Islamic fundamentalism was not central to the Algerian experience, some present day echoes back to Wahhabism and Fundamentalism harken back to that conflict.

These several commonalities yield a cohesiveness that is difficult for the outsider to penetrate. In Horne's lexicon the term is "collectivity"—of leadership, of suffering, and of anonymity ("he was an Arab, dressed as a person," as one non-adept officer observed). Commonality, cohesiveness, collectivity—regardless of the noun, it represents the insurgent identifier and the outsider or governmental separator.

Small Beginnings. Although activity predates any single event of initiation, the massacres of 8 May 1945 at Setif both politicized and martialized many future insurgent leaders. Like the events of Derry's Bloody Sunday pitting peaceful marchers with a smattering of IRA agitators against the military, it is

unclear "who fired the first shot." During the Victory-in- Europe (V-E) Day parade a French commissioner was knocked down and a young Muslim was shot. At that point Muslims roamed the area and slaughtered 103 Europeans and injured an equal number. The French reprisal was brutal—almost a ten-to-one ratio of Muslims killed. Although the eight-year savage war was a decade away, the conflict bloomed from this point. Many future leaders—Abdulhamid Ben Badis, Messali Hadj, Ferhat Abbas—were profoundly influenced by these events. As one said, "Setif has taken us back to the days of the Crusaders"—a common theme in the early 21st Century. Later, on 19 June 1957, the most significant spark and response occurred. On that day, Zabane and Ferradj were guillotined by the French for attacks on civilians. In response Saddi Yasef's hit squads—reminiscent of the Michael Collins shooters of the IRA—roamed the city of Algiers and shot to death 49 civilians. Yasef—whose campaign is immortalized in the film Battle of Algiers, where he plays himself thinly disguised, then initiated the attack which spooled up the war irretrievably. He sent three female bombers to mass gathering places (the parallel to Muslim, female, suicide bombers in Israel in the past few years is unavoidable) in Algiers where they killed scores of *pied noir*. The French response was the shift from a political-military solution to a purely martial approach, one which ultimately spun out of the control of the French government.

Military Primacy. With Yasef's bombings, the French sent in the *paras*. For the reader unfamiliar with France's recent history at the time, they had suffered the humiliation of German defeat and occupation, they faced challenges in Morocco, and they had most recently been embarrassingly evicted from Vietnam after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, where many of their officers and Legionnaires had served and fallen. Over time, both their presence, their methods, and their disdain and ignoring of their civilian masters became greater. That led, in many cases, to excesses. Some French officers defend these excesses as both necessary and fruitful In truth, both led to greater international involvement and pressure on the French government to end the crisis, regardless of military success. So, Algeria won its freedom. The caution of military primacy is a hard-won lesson learned for all persons in uniform, as we face many of the same pressures and frustrations today.

Torture. Terrorism is a potential tool of insurgents; it was a tool used by them, and by their French adversaries, during the savage war. General Godard in Algeria said that "intelligence is capital." Many of the other texts summarized here state the same; however, the means used to obtain such information and the degree to which they are applied is the challenge. Jean-Paul Sartre said during this conflict, "Torture is neither civilian nor military; it is a plague on both of us." Over the long view, this is, of course, always the case. Albert Camus, a native Algerian, finally noted, "Such deeds inevitably led to the demoralization of France and the loss of Algeria."

As a study embodying many of the "Insurgency Common Threads" in our conclusion, Alistair Horne's *A Savage War of Peace* is a worthy addition. As a summary of a conflict with too many parallels to our current efforts fighting Islamic Fundamentalism, its lessons learned and many cautions merits detailed study by all special operators, regardless of their region of interest.

Seven Pillars of Wisdom

One of the great warriors in the unconventional role is T.E. Lawrence. His *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, and the shorter *Revolt in the Desert*, are revolutionary primers on the conduct of a successful insurgency, making the study of these books well worth the investment in understanding insurgency for the 21st Century.

Lawrence was an unlikely soldier. An honors graduate at Oxford, he was a scholar, linguist, historian, and writer. He spent many of the pre-World War I years conducting archaeological digs in Syria. Lawrence saw the potential of an Arab Revolt, using the unifying theme of Arab nationalism—requiring only a charismatic Arab leader to move this strategic approach. In that, Lawrence found Prince Feisal, and immediately became what many special operators and other special operations leaders seek to become—an officer instructor-advisor to potential allies.

Lawrence's strategy, as he defined it, merits discussion. He saw the Revolt's strategy as composed of three elements—algebraic, biological, and psychological. The first was easy; the land the Turks must control was massive, and that offered a strategic advantage to the insurgent bands of Lawrence and Feisal, who dealt in

surprise and distance to maximize effect and minimize casualties. Lawrence saw his forces as "…an influence, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas." This translated algebraically into massive amounts of Turks tied down to static locations, while the insurgents roamed and struck at will—In Lawrence's own words, "We used the smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place."

The second element, biological, was equally confounding for the Turks traditionally-based army. Lawrence called this "bionomics." This defined a relationship between the organism and the environment. Lawrence's insurgents were part of the environment and thrived in it; the Turks, by comparison, were outsiders, marginalized by the environment in which they operated. Lawrence preached "elasticity and freedom of movement." He also highly valued "perfect intelligence"—almost always the advantage of the insurgent, and equally important (and often lacking) with the larger force.

Lawrence's final strategic element was the psychological. It dealt with the will of the Arab to fight for his ethical rights in the environment. Since the environment was both biologically and psychologically Arab, the "Turkish army was an accident, not a target" for Lawrence. The insurgents followed that most ancient of axioms—hit 'em where they ain't—to phenomenal success. His insurrection, draped in nationalism, never sought to confront the enemy but rather to isolate him by destroying lines of communications (note also Mao's emphasis on lines of communications), so vital to a large, standing, occupying army such as the Turk's.

Lawrence's greatest achievement may be his gift of assimilation. As Asprey describes him, "…Thanks to linguistic ability, imagination, perception, intellectual and moral honesty, and immense energy, he went to the tribes, found a leader, determined a viable goal, weighed capabilities, and hit on a type of war compatible to leadership, capabilities, and political goals." This is the heart of insurgent, charismatic leadership; it is also an important facet for the special operator. It is further defined by Lawrence himself in his "Twenty-seven Articles"—a short guide to new officers arriving in-theater for dealing with Arabs; it is also reflective of the special operator mindset, which complements one's soldierly abilities. By any of these several measures, a careful study of Lawrence as insurgent leader and strategist is of great use to the modern special operator.

War in the Shadows

War in the Shadows, by Robert Asprey, is a fine historical overview of guerrilla war, many instances of which actually describe insurgencies, or the fight by a population against its government's forces. While thorough and inclusive through 1975, it is the first half of the first volume this author believes is the most useful for study, as much of what follows in the remainder of the two-volume-set is familiar to most readers. Asprey's work covers all of the big, better known insurgencies—the Philippines, Mexico, Lawrence in World War I, Collins and the Irish Revolution, the Bolsheviks, Mao, British colonial uprisings, global movements in World War II, Southeast Asia; it is his coverage of the lesser known cases which add to the depth of the special operator knowledge base concerning insurgencies.

The initial challenges to modern armies [for their time] that Asprey explores begin 2,500 years ago. He describes The Persian Darius problems with the Scythians, who "…made it impossible for the enemy who invades them to escape destruction, while they themselves are entirely out of his reach." The Greek Demosthenes in 426 B.C. faced the same challenge of insurgent tactics which Mao would later espouse, when the Aetolians "…being swift of foot and lightly equipped…" constantly harassed and destroyed the Greeks. Alexander the Great faced the same tactics in Turkestan and Bokhara. "No great battles awaited Alexander; he was to be faced by a people's war, a war of mounted guerrillas whom, when he advanced would suddenly appear in his rear,…and when pursued vanished into the Turkoman steppes." The Roman challenges in Spain against the Gauls met with the same insurgent tactics that work today.

Asprey voices a caution relevant to the modern reader. It concerns the loss of memory, the loss of lessons learned from one experience to the next, one war to the next, one generation of military professionals to the next (not to mention our civilian oversight). Speaking of the Romans—the reader can decide if the words remain accurate today—Asprey says, "The lesson of the earlier insurgency crises must have struck even the most obtuse governor and dim-witted military commander; yet, with the passing of each crisis, the

lessons seemingly vanished into the prevailing morass compounded by imperial arrogance, personal greed, and professional ineptness." If the lesson applies, even in part, to today, then it is hoped the reader heeds that caution. Asprey applauds the modern special operator by default. He says that these officers are "adaptable." That they think in terms of the "…unexpected or the indirect approach based on cunning." He says they must think at the "…strategic, political, and tactical levels."

Asprey even mentions previous [ancient] literature on the subject of insurgency. One of the most compelling is Nikephoros Phokas 965 volume titled, *On Shadowing Warfare*. In it the author describes this type of warfare succinctly and aptly. His translator observes, the methods "…rely heavily upon the natural advantages offered by terrain, on the willing cooperation of the civilian population, on good intelligence, on interrupting the enemy's lines of communications, and finally on the demoralizing effect of an endless sequence of small, surprise, 'carefully planned tactical attacks in a war of strategic defensive.'" Mao and Kitson—describing insurgency operations—said it no better than this centuries before.

Of interest is understanding both the political and martial aspects of insurgent warfare in the case on Napoleon's Grand Army in Russia in 1811-12. The political element—Napoleon versus Alexander—soon resulted in abuses by both sides against the native population. That then caused numerous insurgent bands to spring up—Ermolai Chetvertakov, Estepan Eremenko, and Ermolai Vasilyev all offer case studies of interest in the art of guerrilla/insurgent warfare. By some accounts, over half a million French soldiers died in this catastrophe, much of the losses due to the harassment of the insurgent bands.

The power to embarrass the regular forces or to cause the local population to lose faith in our ability to help them is also an important aspect Asprey highlights. Describing the 19th Century fight of the British in Burma, he says that insurgents attack loyal locals who, "…having cause to recognize that we were too far off to protect them, lose confidence in our power and throw in their lot with the insurgents…In a country itself one vast military obstacle, the seizure of the leaders of the rebellion, though of paramount importance, thus becomes a source of great difficulty." Here, not much has changed.

One final case study, to highlight the importance of politics in insurgencies, in this case General Hubert Lyautey in Indochina in the late 19th Century. The general was known as one who took an interest in the social welfare of those with whom he came in contact—the population of Indochina. He understood, "In every country there are existing frameworks. The great mistake for Europeans coming there as a conqueror is to destroy these frameworks." He battled the complicity of the population with insurgents by applying "…social, economic, and political measures designed to elicit equal if not greater support…" for the troops of Lyautey as for the insurgents. The careful reader notes that, like the modern special operator, no mention of a marital solution appeared in the solution the general offered. Like Mao, Lyautey also relied heavily on information, on the correct behavior of his men, on his personal charisma and example, and in the care he took cementing relationships with tribal authorities. Lyautey summarizes his approach eloquently—"The rational method—the only one, the proper one, and also the one for which I was chosen rather than anyone else—is the constant interplay of force with politics." This remains good guidance to the special operator as both advisor and warrior.

Casebook of Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare

The Casebook of Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare remains a comparative studies classic. Although published in 1962—limiting the case studies to those occurring prior to that year and also limiting the case studies to those occurring in the 20th Century—many of the most vital insurgencies of the 20th Century are included: Vietnam, Malaya, Guatemala, Cuba, Algeria, Iraq and Iran, China, Spain, and Czechoslovakia, among the more familiar of these.

The authors in the Special Operations Research Office recognized the need to extend the understanding of the processes of violent social change—including the already-established linkage between martial and political-diplomatic elements of insurgencies—and use that as a central focus of the volume. In this manner, they "…extend our knowledge of how revolutions are born, grow, succeed, or fail." Designed as an unclassified, open source only "reader" on insurgencies, it remains one of the best initial references for the study of the twenty-three case studies it includes.

As previously stated, the comparison across varied insurgencies is a complex, difficult task. The authors sought to ease this burden by application of a standard format across all the case studies. This systematic ordering allows for ease of comparison and contrast among and between the studies. First, the case studies are grouped into seven geographic Sections—allowing for ease of regional comparison and contrast. Seeking to describe the complex political, military, cultural, social, and economic features of each case study makes perfect sense and is of immediate value-added to the special operator reader of the studies.

Each case then develops in four standard parts: Major Historical Events, leading up to the insurgency; Environment of the Revolution, which includes geography; Form and Characteristics, delving into actors, forces, and goals; and Effects of the insurgency, both near- and long-term. Within each of these four major sections are four to five common sub-headings. These are designed to both ensure as complete an understanding of the case as possible and also to answer common operational questions which the professional reader needs—both for near-term study and perhaps for long-term application as an advisor or warfighter.

The Casebook of Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare ends with a list of recommended reading, its final contribution to the serious special operator student of insurgency.

Low-Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping

Frank Kitson was a Oxford-trained warrior with extensive experience in insurgent warfare, particularly in Africa against the Mau Mau. His thoughtful studies of the art of counter insurgency remain of value today. One of the most highly recommended of Kitson's texts is *Low-Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping*. While its general lessons are applicable to any officer studying insurgency, Kitson's view on the development of a specially trained cadre of country specialists is of further interest to the special operator reader.

Even in the 1971 edition, Kitson saw the world as a place where insurgent warfare represented the wars of the future. Insurgency "…is the kind of war that fits the conditions of the modern age, while being at the same time well-suited to take advantage of social discontent, racial ferment, and nationalist fervours." This continues to ring true in 2007.

Like most of the authors represented herein, Kitson saw force as only a part of the equation of subversion and insurgency. He said, "Force, if it is used at all, is used to reinforce other forms of persuasion, whereas in more orthodox forms of war, persuasion in various forms is used to back up force." He sees force as secondary—unstated is its role in the support of the politics of the insurgency, as Mao and Lawrence both highlight. He then clearly defines the two primary roles of the insurgent—roles the reader must understand in order to counter. "The really important point is that the leaders of a subversive movement have two separate but closely related jobs to do; they must gain the support of a portion of the population, and they must impose their will on the government either by military defeat or by unendurable harassment."

Kitson is among the authors who address terrorism as a part of insurgency. The insurgent tasks are clear. "Tasks may also include acts of sabotage and terrorism designed to ensure that the government deploys disproportionately large bodies of its own forces on protection duties and searches, and carefully calculated acts of revolting brutality designed to bring excessive government retaliation on the population thereby turning them against the government." Kitson saw this work in Africa, and he was as equally familiar with the terror imposed by the Irish Republican Army and its carefully calculated use of terror which often caused the provocation to over-react [by the British Army] they sought.

One of the key aspects of Kitson's view is the over-arching importance of information when fighting an insurgency. He saw it as "paramount." He continues, "The main problem of fighting insurgents lies in finding them, and it could be said that the process of developing information…constitutes the basic tactical function of counter insurgency operations." (A parallel view dealing with the Indian Wars of 1986 in the US cautions the commander, "…be careful when operating independently with limited force and with inadequate knowledge of enemy and terrain."—a caution, along with dividing force, that Custer probably should have read.) He then describes what the author sees as a common special operator trait—a curiosity, and an ability to think outside of the doctrinal box. "The [Intel] process is a sort of game based on intense mental

activity allied to a determination to find things out and an ability to regard everything on its own merits without regard to customs, doctrine, or drill." That is a partial description of every good special operator. Interestingly, Kitson describes the development of a special operator corps in some detail.

Kitson saw quite clearly the need for area specialists. He says that the army owes it to the nation to provide properly trained and experienced officers "…capable of advising the government and its various agencies at every level on how best to conduct the campaign." To do this the individual must "…submerge themselves in the atmosphere of the country." Then, he even more explicitly states, "Each officer or group of officers could specialize in a particular area of the world… specialization should involve visits and some…of the languages of the area as well as a thorough study of the area's problems." Kitson, among the selected authors, is the one who most specifically calls for special operator preparation—as counterinsurgency advisors, in this limited case—and by that measure alone this selection merits a careful reading.

Small Wars Manual

Over a half century old, this landmark work continues to inform what we know about, and how we practice or observe insurgencies. In the early part of the 20th Century, the Marines were our "force projection" platform of choice. Their several small wars lessons learned were captured over time. The Marine Corps Schools' Major S.M. Harrington first did a systematic study in 1921. Major C.J. Miller added to this with a study of the Dominican republic campaign in 1923. Later, several different campaigns of the time were serialized in the Marine Corps Gazette. Finally, a consolidated, overarching version appeared in 1940, the United States Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual*.

Much of the Manual is a tactics guide. However, its introductory chapter and its chapters on handling the government and the population are central to the theme of the present article—a primer on insurgency.

The Introduction begins with one of the most cogent definitions applicable to insurgencies—"Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation." Uncovering this simple definition is [alone] worth the investment in opening the Manual.

The legal aspects of small wars are highlighted. While much of the Manual's focus, given its heritage and timing was more applicable to the Monroe Doctrine, its lessons apply generally. First, use of force is illegal against other states—except where the "right of self-preservation" applies. That rule was invoked in the present Global War on Terror (GWOT), particularly in the case of Iraq.

The basis of a strategy for small wars is explored in depth. Right off the bat, the Manual establishes the link between force and political strategy. In this strategy, both a military and a political strategy are executed simultaneously. Then the strategy must take into account the adversary—and whether that adversary follows the rule of law—and the civilian population. It also falls to small wars to take into account the terrain in which these operations occur, as their impact is different than those of a regular force.

What the Marine Corps identifies as "Psychology" in Section III is rather closely aligned with those elements of interest to the special operator. This includes; political considerations, social considerations, religious considerations, and the historical environment and its history—and respect for them all. Finally, the Section deals with how to interact with local populations for greatest success when facing an insurgency.

Later chapters and sections deal with the armed insurgent, and either disarming him or rendering him ineffective. Key in the set of actions one must take is the re-establishment of local authority and the formation of a constabulary (the same approach we are taking at present in Iraq). That set of efforts then bridge normally into the development of a strong local government; it is the development of a strong local government versus a strong national government that currently plagues our counterinsurgency efforts in the GWOT. The USMC *Small Wars Manual* merits study, although more selective reading is required, unless one reads it in preparation to be an on-ground commander.

The USMC Small Wars Manual should not be confused with a similarly named predecessor, the equally

influential *Small Wars—their Principles and Practices*, written in 1896 by Charles Callwell. As an aside, Callwell's work is worth a brief mention. Callwell said that "Small wars are a heritage of extended empire"; while the US may not be imperialistic in our view, one might recognize why those insurgents engaging our forces might not have the same point of view. Callwell called upon the complicated organism which is the modern, regular army to adapt to the realities that small wars represent, that these conflicts must be approached "on a method totally different from the stereotyped system."

He says that "good intelligence exploited by mobility" are essential elements in countering an insurgency, and this axiom remains true today. While urging the development of self-reliant officers (a requisite special operator trait), he states that the guerrilla war is the one the regular army "…always has to dread [because]…an effective campaign becomes well-nigh impossible." His most vital lesson is deeply buried in the text—the importance of "national commitment" to fighting a small war over the long-haul—certainly a lesson that is applicable today in our present campaign in Iraq. The lessons the Marines and Callwell teach are vital to today's warrior, none more so than the trusted pol-mil advisor who is the foreign area specialist.

Final Thoughts

Having established both an historical context in the second section of this paper and current doctrine in the initial section, this overview closes with some thoughts on applicability to the special operator warrior diplomat.

Insurgency and the 21st Century Special Operator—Conclusions

The several facets of insurgency—political, economic, diplomatic, and martial—demand that the special operator be fluent in this form of warfare in order to complete all special operator roles.

Not only is Sam Griffith's translation of Mao's work of value in itself as a revelation of Mao's thought, but also his Introduction to the 1941 work is of value as it illuminates both the value of understanding guerrilla warfare (as a sub-set of insurgency) and of the careful preparation of those officers charged with both the understanding and conduct or mitigation of such campaigns. In a brief caution, Griffith states, "We go to considerable trouble to keep soldiers out of politics, and even more to keep politics out of soldiers. Guerrillas do exactly the opposite." He understands, as Mao understood, that politics and guerrilla warfare are inseparable. Like Mao and his fish in the sea, Griffith says, "the principal concern of all guerrilla leaders [in our case, read "insurgent leaders"] [is] to get the water to the right temperature and to keep it there…" a clear message to running or defeating an insurgency. A soldier's understanding of the political element is crucial, and especially so in the special operator.

Common Insurgency Threads
Political versus Military Goals — Political Primacy Military = A Means To an End
Protracted War
The People
Commonality of Goals — People and Insurgents Disparate Approach — Insurgents and Government
Insurgent Cohesiveness — Ethnic, Religious, Linguistic
Intelligence/Info — Critical for both factions
Time, Space, and Will — the Insurgent Advantage
Dynamism, Speed, Rapidity of Focus Shifts
Disadvantages of the "Home Team" — Holding Terrain, Economy, World Opinion
Judicious Use of the Attack Means of Terrorism
Torture — Double-edged sword for either side
Loss of Memory (Political and Martial) — Insurgency Lessons Learned (And Lost)
Insurgent Use of the Ancient Rules of Warfare
Global Interest — To Include the Media

Griffith also places the value of understanding insurgencies in perspective for the military man. "A revolutionary war is never confined within the bounds of military action. Because its purpose is to destroy the existing society and its institutions and to replace them with a completely new state structure, any revolutionary war is a unity of which the constituent parts, in varying importance, are military, political, economic, social, and psychological." He has precisely described the modern special operator and, at the same time, highlighted the importance of the study of insurgencies.

The careful military student of insurgency, particularly in our era, should strive to understand the mindset of the adversary. The following caution from Asprey has never been more relevant, if perhaps a bit inflammatory, "To define (and condemn) terror from a peculiar social, economic, political, and emotional plane is to display a self-righteous attitude that, totally unrealistic, is doomed to be disappointed by the harsh facts." The modern special operator is particularly well-prepared and mentally suited to adhere to this caution, and to pass that caution professionally to a wide range of governmental agencies and one's commanders.

Larry Kahaner's short commentary on both Callwell and the Marine's Small War manuals captures the essence of the present paper—what we need are "…more soldiers with language skills, armed with durable rifles, who understand history, foreign culture, religion, local customs, and guerilla warfare." That forms the heart of this paper's summary of the importance of the foreign area officer and his understanding of insurgency.

The common threads of these several works apply to the in-depth preparation of the special operator, with several "Special Operator threads" of our own:

- ✓ Regional Immersion;
- ✓ Linguistic Capability;
- ✓ Importance of Intelligence;
- ✓ Understanding of social, cultural, historical, political, diplomatic, and military underpinnings of a country or region;
- ✓ Necessity of being: first, a Warfighter, and second, a special operator–with these complementary skill sets each special forces soldier possesses in spades; and,
- ✓ Thorough understanding of the nature of 21st Century warfare—as represented by insurgency and counterinsurgency.

The soldier only needs to remember these essential elements, at all stages of development and execution, to be the best political-insurgent-counterinsurgent advisor the assignment demands.

Afghan National Army commandos from 2nd Company, 205th Kandak search a suspected insurgent hideout in the Kapisa province of Afghanistan Jan. 19, 2008. [DOD Image Library]

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